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[S]ome nursing home residents who need dentures will 
likely not be able to get them [due to recent Medicaid 
cuts]; but in those cases, nursing homes should grind, 
puree or blend residents’ food so they can eat, the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare informed nursing 
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home managers this month. The [insurance] cuts, [which 
went into effect April 1] were mandated by the Idaho 
Legislature as a budget-balancing measure and, among 
other reductions, limit dental care for Medicaid recipients 
over age 21 to emergencies only, unless they are 
pregnant.—Idaho Mountain Express, April 17, 2002.1 
Jane Bryant Quinn’s June 3 column, “Shame Of The Rich: 
Making Themselves Poor,” puts a needed spotlight on the 
unfortunate fact that impoverishing oneself is a 
prerequisite for Medicaid assistance. 
Ms. Quinn’s accurate depiction of the extent to which 
some wealthy Americans will go when it comes to hiding 
and sheltering assets in order to get “free” Medicaid 
coverage demonstrates how the system itself is in disarray.  
While some elderly with substantial financial nest eggs 
attempt to beat the system in an effort to qualify for 
Medicaid, those truly in need see daily their access to 
quality care threatened. 
The fact of the matter is that in state after state, Medicaid 
is severely under funded in a manner that undermines the 
original intent of the program - which is to provide 
medical assistance to low-income Americans. Those most 
in need are being shortchanged by those who, long ago, 
should and could have been planning and saving for the 
possibility of long term care needs, had they been 
apprised of the consequences of not doing so and 
encouraged with appropriate government incentives.—
American Health Care Association opinion editorial on 
Jane Bryant Quinn’s June 3, 2001, Washington Post article.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For lawyers, ethics and morality are not equivalents.  Although 
ethics is frequently the study of morals and, as such, is the study of 
what ought to happen,3 for the lawyer its primary meaning is 
 
 1. In Idaho, Medicaid Cuts Means No Dental Care, THE ELDER LAW EBULLETIN 
(April 23, 2002), at http://www.tn-elderlaw.com/telb/020423.html#n3. 
 2. The Briefing Room: Opinion Editorial regarding Washington Post June 3, 2001 
Jane Bryant Quinn Article, American Health Care Association, at 
http://www.ahca.org/brief/010603.htm (last visited July 20, 2002). 
 3. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF 
MORALS 10 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., Prometheus Books 1987) (1785). In 
a purely relative ethical system, it may be difficult to identify what ought to 
happen.  In fact, when one is told that he ought to do this or that, the response is 
2
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adherence to established canons of ethics.  In practice, this means 
adherence to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as adopted 
in the state of the lawyer’s practice and to any other local rules that 
apply to lawyers.4 
Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct [MRPC] 
distinguishes the lawyer’s role as adviser from his role as advocate, 
and it is the adviser’s “hat” that elder law attorneys wear when 
engaging in Medicaid planning.  As advisers, lawyers may consider 
not only technical legal rules but also “moral, economic, social and 
political factors” relevant to the client’s situation.5  Although the 
client, not the lawyer, ultimately decides what to do with the advice 
given,6 it is not inappropriate for the lawyer to refer to relevant 
moral and ethical considerations.7  Because the lawyer’s ethical 
analysis is, in part, derivative, the practical challenge for us as elder 
law attorneys is whether we ought to provide Medicaid planning 
advice.8  If we advise clients concerning Medicaid planning, then 
our task is to provide competent advice within the bounds of law 
and applicable ethical canons.9 
 
often, “You have been dreaming.” See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 186 (2d 
ed. 1994). 
 4. A few states, such as Tennessee, still follow the older American Bar 
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility.  For our purposes, 
however, the differences, if any, are unimportant, so we will focus on the newer 
Model Rules, first issued in 1983.  BNA INC., ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:3 (2002). 
 5. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002) [hereinafter MRPC].  See 
also id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (stating that advice couched in narrowly legal terms may be of 
little value to a client). 
 6. Id. R. 1.2(a) (stating a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation); RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: 
THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2002-2003, at §§ 3-3.2, 
19-1 (2002). Interestingly, in a substituted judgment case, one court noted “it 
cannot be reasonably contended that a competent, reasonable individual . . . 
would not engage in the estate and Medicaid planning proposed in the petition.”  
In re John XX, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 (App. Div. 1996). 
 7. MRPC, R. 2.1, cmt. 2. 
 8. Model Rule 1.2(b) underscores the derivative nature of the lawyer-
adviser’s task. Id. R. 1.2(b).  Representation does not constitute an endorsement of 
the client’s viewpoint. Nonetheless, the lawyer cannot provide the guidance 
suggested in Rule 2.1 without having examined moral, economic, social and 
political factors.  Thus, the study of ethics in this context should yield practical, 
rather than theoretical, results.  Cf. BERNARD MAYO, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT AND 
WRONG 1 (1986) (“Is ethics, or moral philosophy, a practical or a theoretical 
subject?”). 
 9. See MRPC, R. 1.1; GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.1 
(2000), http://www.gabar.org/grpc11.htm; Proposed TENNESSEE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2001),  
3
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II. THE ELDER LAW ATTORNEY’S ETHICAL DILEMMA 
Clients request Medicaid planning advice primarily to lessen 
the economic impact of long-term care.10  As detailed in this article, 
the cost of long-term care is often catastrophic for elderly, middle-
class individuals and couples.  Is it “wrong” to help the elderly 
protect their assets by engaging in Medicaid planning?11  The short 
answer is “no.”  Health care costs threaten to deplete an elder’s 
estate, during his lifetime and after death.  The goal of Medicaid 
planning is therefore to minimize the financial impact of the cost 
of health care and long-term care.  Ethical rules allow elder law 
attorneys to assist clients who wish to minimize those costs, even if 
the plan is aggressive, as long as the representation is carried out 
within the bounds of the law.12 
We frame the issues by pointing out why the elderly seek out 
advice: 
[O]lder Americans must devote 80% of their income to 
food, shelter, health care and transportation . . . .Being 
old in America means taking the leftovers from a health 
care system that caters to the young.  The 10% of our 
people over 65 account for 28% of the nation’s total 
medical bill.  Yet Medicare--for all the good it has done--
pays less than 40% of the medical bills of its recipients, 
and the proportion has been declining.  The strength of 
the medical lobby has prevented needed changes in the 
health care delivery system, perpetuating needless 
 
http://www.tba.org/committees/Conduct/Exhibit-A/newfinalred-a.pdf); MRPC, 
R. 1.16(a)(1); Durie v. State, 751 So.2d 685, 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(reiterating that lawyers cannot engage in dishonest or unethical conduct).  In this 
case, a lawyer was held accountable when he “stepped over the ethical and 
criminal line” by misrepresenting Medicaid’s portion of a settlement.  Id. 
 10. “If your parent wants to protect his assets before going on Medicaid, get 
him to meet with a lawyer who specializes in Medicaid planning because the rules 
are complicated.”  VIRGINIA MORRIS, HOW TO CARE FOR AGING PARENTS 260 (1996).  
For an analysis of the economic impact of long term care, see LISA ALECXIH & 
DAVID KENNELL, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LONG-TERM CARE ON INDIVIDUALS (1994), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/ecoimpes.htm. 
 11. While one “can debate whether Medicaid planning is sound public social 
or fiscal policy,” it is nonetheless legal.  In re Baird, 634 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 (Sup. Ct. 
1995); In re Daniels, 618 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1994).  We recognize that 
lawyers who undertake representation for a client must abide by the client’s 
objectives.  See, e.g., MPRC, R. 1.2(a).  The inquiry here is whether the attorney 
should accept employment. 
 12. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at § 22-1.2 (discussing advice in the tax planning 
context, quoting A.B.A. Formal Opinion 85-352). Medicaid planning is not hiding 
assets.  Medicaid planners use the rules of Medicaid to the advantage of the client. 
4
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inefficiencies that drive the costs of Medicare skyward. . . . 
[W]e [must] alleviate the heavy medical bill burden now 
borne by the elderly.13 
Since Morris Udall spoke those words 27 years ago, little has 
changed--except that America is getting older.14  Meanwhile, health 
care costs continue to increase as a percentage of income,15 and 
long-term care is often needed at a time when income has fallen.16  
The elderly seek competent legal advice about how to respond 
when crisis looms, and when it strikes.  In discharging his duty 
under MRPC 2.1, though, what factors should the elder law 
attorney focus on?  This article will explore the “moral, economic, 
social and political factors” implicated by Medicaid planning.17 
We examine differing stakeholder positions, current long-term 
care financing issues, and reform options, albeit with Medicaid 
planning as the focal point.18  The current system, or Medicaid 
planning, for that matter, is not necessarily the best long-term 
solution for the elderly.19  In the end, we believe the law should be 
structured to provide adequate health care, including long-term 
care, for all persons, regardless of economic status or age.20  Elders 
 
 13. Morris K. Udall, Public Policy and the Future of Aging, Address given 
before the National Council on Aging (Sept. 30, 1975), http://www. 
library.arizona.edu/branches/spc/udall/aging_htm.html. 
 14. THOMAS S. BODENHEIMER & KEVIN GRUMBACH, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH 
POLICY: A CLINICAL APPROACH 3 (2d ed. 1998). 
 15. AARP, BEYOND 50.02: A REPORT TO THE NATION ON TRENDS IN HEALTH 
SECURITY 5 (2002) (reporting that persons aged fifty and older spent an average of 
$3,881 per year for non-nursing home medical expenses in 1996, up 310% from 
1977), http://www.aarp.org/beyond50/graphics/pdfs/beyond50_02one.pdf. 
 16. Income for households aged 65 and older averaged $21,827, compared 
with income for households under sixty-five averaging $84,591.  U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, REPORT HINC-01, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS, BY TOTAL 
MONEY INCOME IN 2000 (2001), http://ferret.bls.census.gov/macro/032001/ 
hhinc/new01_001.htm. 
 17. To wit: a moral, economic, social and political base.  As for ethics, it is the 
study of morals or moral issues. In a profession, ethics is an understanding, either 
formal or informal, of acceptable conduct. WILLIAM S. SAHAKIAN, ETHICS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES AND PROBLEMS 6 (1974). Ethics rules without practical 
application are defective. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 2 (2d ed. 1993). 
 18. Since it would be impossible to adopt individual views of “right” and 
“good,” the “good” referred to in this article is Aristotle’s notion of the supreme 
good. See ARISTOTLE, XIX NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 5 (H. Rackham trans., 1968).  
Medicaid is a creature of politics and, therefore, its end should be the good of 
Man. Id. at 7. 
 19. MAYO, supra note 8, at 67 (“Laws are subject to criticism in a way in which 
morality is not.”). 
 20. “Age should never be recognized as the determinative factor in the 
balancing test for health care services.”  George P. Smith II, Allocating Health Care 
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should be guaranteed access to good health care.  Until universal 
access becomes a reality, we conclude that Medicaid planning is 
justified within a health care system that elevates profit over patient 
care. 
III. HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The public health infrastructure consists of those resources 
necessary to deliver essential public health services to every 
community.21  Its goals are (or should be) to provide good care to 
more or less the entire population without bankrupting the 
treasury in the process.22  The value society places on health is 
pivotal when determining what resources will or must be devoted to 
delivering health care services.23  Also pivotal, in the context of this 
article, is the value of an elderly person’s life.24  Assuming resources 
 
Resources to the Elderly, 1 ELDER L. REV. 21, 24 (2002), http://www.uws.edu.au/ 
law/elderlaw/smith.pdf.  America’s market system efficiently meets the needs of 
the young and strong.  Its record is less impressive where elders are concerned, 
possibly due to the waning of productivity in later years.  Id. at 21.  “The way we 
treat our older citizens in this country is like certain ancient tribal societies, where 
a person who is too old for hunting and warfare was placed ceremonially on a raft 
and allowed to float down a river.” Udall, supra note 13.  This view emerged, in 
large part, during the Industrial Revolution.  As jobs moved from farms to 
factories, “[o]lder citizens either could not compete or were seen as taking jobs 
from younger breadwinners.  The result is that they came to be considered a 
burden on families and society in general.”  JIMMY CARTER, THE VIRTUES OF AGING 
12 (1998). 
 21. 2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010, 
at 23-3 (2d ed. 2000), http://www.health.gov/healthypeople/document/ 
pdf/volume2/23PHI.pdf.  The public health infrastructure includes governmental 
and non-governmental entities that provide health care services.  Id.  A stated goal 
of HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010 is the elimination of health disparities. Id. at 23-6. 
 22. David Wilsford, Commentary: Ideas, Institutions, and Resources, 25 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 975, 975 (2000). 
 23. See H.R. Con. Res. 99, 107th Cong. (2001) (urging Congress to enact 
legislation by October 2004 that guarantees health care access to every person in 
the United States regardless of income, age, employment or health status); Roger 
N. Levy, Ethical Issues: The Rationing of Care to the Geriatric Patient, 2 ARCHIVES OF THE 
AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS 113, 114-115 (1998) (reviewing differing 
legal and philosophic positions relating to health care as a right), 
http://www.hospitalmanagement.net/informer/management/pc_social/index.ht
ml; Leonard Peikoff, Health Care is Not a Right, Speech delivered at a Town Hall 
Meeting on the Clinton Health Plan (Dec. 11, 1993) (arguing that socialized 
medicine is immoral), http://www.bdt.com/pages/Peikoff.html; see also WILLIAM 
D. NORDHAUS, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: THE CONTRIBUTION OF IMPROVED HEALTH 
TO LIVING STANDARDS (2002) (arguing that health is a measure of national 
prosperity), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8818. 
 24. Smith, supra note 20, at 22. 
6
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are available,25 should they be deployed to improve health and to 
save, or prolong lives?  If society places a premium on health (and 
life) and dedicates resources to the delivery of health care services, 
access will expand and, presumably, the quality of life will improve. 
Although many nations, and the World Health Organization, 
regard health care as a fundamental human right,26 the United 
States does not.27  Instead, in the United States health care is a 
commodity.28  Health care services are bought and sold on the “free 
market.”  The market is competitive, largely amoral, and (in 
theory) governed by the free market’s “invisible hand,” within a 
framework of public laws and regulations by non-governmental 
organizations (for example, accrediting organizations such as the 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 
which accredits the majority of the country’s medical facilities).29  If 
 
 25. See discussion of rationing, infra this section. 
 26. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, HEALTH AS A HUMAN RIGHT, at 
http://www.who.int/archives/who50/en/human.htm (last visited July 20, 2002). 
For a Judeo-Christian perspective on health care as a right, see Herbert W. Titus, 
The Right to Medical Care Within a Biblical Worldview: The Declaration of 
Independence and the United States Constitution, Speech before the Conference 
on Health Care in Crisis: A Biblical Response (May 2, 1992), http://bmei.org/ 
jbem/volume10/num2/titus.htm. 
 27. See, e.g., In re Gonzalez, 586 N.Y.S.2d 861, 865 (App. Div. 1992) (stating 
that since there is no system of public health insurance, all individuals who possess 
the means are required to pay for their own care); see also Editorial, Where Health 
Care is Not a Right, 359 THE LANCET 1871 (2002) (“Americans and their families are 
living shorter and sicker lives because they live in a country where access to health 
care remains a privilege and not a right.”), http://www.thelancet.com. 
 28. Wilsford, supra note 22, at 975; MARCIA ANGELL ET AL., PHYSICIANS’ 
WORKING PAPER ON SINGLE-PAYER NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (2001), 
http://www.kaisernetwork.org/health_cast/uploaded_files/whitepaper.pdf; Leslie 
P. Francis, Legal Rights to Health Care at the End of Life, 282 MED. STDNT. J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 2079 (1999), http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/msjama/articles/vol_282/ 
no_21/jms90042.htm; see also BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at viii, 21-
46. “Access” means “the timely use of personal health services to achieve the best 
possible health outcomes.”  1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010, at 1-40 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter HEALTHY PEOPLE I], 
http://health.gov/healthypeople/document/HTML/Volume1/01Access.htm#_T
oc489432806. “Access to quality care is important to eliminate health disparities 
and increase the quality and years of healthy life for all persons in the United 
States.”  Id. at 1-3. 
 29. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 194 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1992) (1776); Donald W. Light, 
Sociological Perspectives on Competition in Health Care, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
969-970 (2000); see also ID Sec. Systems Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint Systems, Inc., 
198 F. Supp. 2d 598, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (explaining the notion that a business 
person will make decisions that tend to maximize profit is so basic to our 
economic system that it hardly requires citation).  Markets can be disrupted by 
7
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health care services were viewed as a right instead of as a 
commodity, health care would be an entitlement that the right 
holder could demand regardless of cost.30 
America’s free market health care system is a political 
construct regarding how health care will be delivered.31  This 
construct rests on the assumption that competition, driven by each 
provider’s desire to maximize personal gain, will unleash energy 
and imagination and, thereby, increase societal wealth.32  
Nonetheless, the reality is that persons with financial means have 
greater access to health care, while those without financial means 
 
regulation.  Conversion from a fee-for-service to an insurance model introduced 
moral hazard into the equation, arguably, giving the invisible hand a case of 
arthritis.  See generally BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 7-20 (discussing 
evolution of the health care payment system from out-of-pocket payments to 
individual insurance, then to employer provided insurance and finally, the 
introduction of social insurance).  For an interesting analysis, see MARTIN GAYNOR, 
ARE INVISIBLE HANDS GOOD HANDS?: MORAL HAZARD, COMPETITION, AND THE 2ND 
BEST IN HEALTH CARE MARKETS (1998) (arguing that insurance leads to excess 
consumption; however, competition, or even monopoly, in insurance markets 
reduces the market price for health care, which benefits consumers; the benefit to 
consumers outweighs the loss of profits suffered by the medical industry), 
http://equilibrium.heinz.cmu.edu/mgaynor/papers/2ndbestfind2.pdf. 
 30. Levy, supra note 23, at 114. Because health care resources are limited, 
most moralists therefore argue for health care as a limited right.  Id. at 115.  Of 
course, universal access would increase moral hazard (discussed later), which may 
introduce new problems, such as queuing for services. See, e.g., PETER LANDRY, 
BLUPETE’S COMMENTARY: A RIGHT TO MEDICAL CARE (1999) (complaining about the 
wait for health care services in Canada and noting that wealthy Canadians get 
immediate care in the U.S.), at http://www.blupete.com/Commentary/ 
MedCareMay’99.htm.  Recent research reported in the journal Health Affairs, 
however, found that surprisingly few Canadians travel to the United States for 
health care, despite the persistence of the myth, suggesting that anecdotes of long 
lines endured by Canadians in their own country may be nothing more than 
fodder for critics of universal health care.  Steven J. Katz et al., Phantoms in the 
Snow: Canadians Use of Health Care Services in the United States, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 
May-June 2002, at 19. 
 31. See Deborah Stone, United States, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 953, 953 
(2000).  The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services proposes that 100% of 
the U.S. population have access to health care by 2010; its proposal follows the 
free market model through the use of insurance.  See HEALTHY PEOPLE I, supra note 
28, at 1-13, 1-14. 
 32. See Light, supra note 29, at 969-71.  Light notes that competition rewards 
innovation, those who create needs.  There is nothing inherent about the free 
market system that rewards efficiency in meeting established needs.  “The 
traditional debate pitted arguments of monopoly and monopsony on the one side, 
and innovation on the other, . . . it was feared that government production would 
be technologically inefficient and innovation would be stifled.”  DAVID M. CUTLER, 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, HEALTH CARE AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
30 (2002), http://www.nber.org/papers/w8802. 
8
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enjoy only limited access.33  The effect on the overall good health of 
persons with limited means is predictable.34 
Long-term care is the predominate issue in Medicaid 
planning, which makes those services most relevant to this 
examination.  Long-term care services include: 
[a] broad range of health and social services delivered in 
institutions, in the community and at home.  Long-term 
care services include institutional services, such as those 
delivered in nursing homes, rehabilitation hospitals, 
subacute care facilities, hospice facilities, and assisted 
living facilities; services delivered in the home, such as 
home health and personal care, hospice, homemaker, and 
meals; and community-based services, such as adult day 
care, social services, congregate meals, transportation and 
escort services, legal protective services, and counseling 
for client as well as their caregivers.35 
People with physical or mental conditions that limit their 
capacity for self-care36 need these services to improve functioning, 
maintain existing living functions, or to slow deterioration in 
functioning while care is delivered in the least restrictive 
environment.37  Yet long-term care is expensive, thereby limiting 
access.38 
 
 33. Whether access to health care should be defined in terms of wealth is a 
fundamental question for America.  Although we value private property rights, 
and where they exist, there will always be inequalities of fortune, see Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915), one can legitimately question whether health care, 
which is often linked to life itself, should be held hostage in this manner.  “Should, 
for example, a millionaire be allowed greater access to life-saving treatment than a 
pauper, even if we gladly allow greater access to exotic vacation spots?” Sanford 
Levinson, The Welfare State, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 553, 555 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).  We think not. 
 34. See Stone, supra note 31, at 954.  Stone’s article is part of a series reviewing 
health care systems around the globe.  In 1999, U.S. Census Bureau statistics 
showed that 44 million Americans were uninsured. Id. There is a clear relationship 
between health and wealth.  “Poorer people die younger and are sicker than 
richer people . . . .” Angus Deaton, Policy Implications of the Gradient of Health and 
Wealth, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 13.  For an interesting viewpoint on 
the virtues of a health care free market, see SHELDON L. RICHMAN, A FREE MARKET 
FOR HEALTH CARE, at http://www.amatecon.com/etext/dosm/dosm-ch03.html 
(last visited July 20, 2002). 
 35. HEALTHY PEOPLE I, supra note 28, at 1-41. 
 36. Ability to care for oneself is sometimes measured by reference to one’s 
ability to perform activities of daily living, 42 C.F.R. § 483.25(a)(1) (2001), or 
instrumental activities of daily living. 
 37. HEALTHY PEOPLE I, supra note 28, at 1-6. 
 38. Health care costs for America’s elderly rose three times faster than the 
9
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IV. THE DEVASTATING FINANCIAL IMPACT OF LONG-TERM CARE 
Long-term care can be ruinously expensive for individuals and 
families.39  When families need long-term care, paying for it can 
quickly put them between a rock and a hard place.40  The national 
average monthly cost for nursing home care is $4,654.41  By 
contrast, the median income in FY 2000 for the 11.6 million 
households headed by persons aged sixty-five or older was $32,854 
(or $2,737.83 per month).42  Many elderly Americans simply cannot 
 
CPI from 1977 through 1987; by 1996, excluding nursing home costs, “[m]edicare 
beneficiaries spent an average of $2600 out-of-pocket on health care costs above 
what Medicare and private insurers paid.  This represented 21% of household 
income for elderly individuals, up from 15% in 1987.”  Mark P. Doescher et al., 
Supplemental Insurance and Mortality in Elderly Americans, 9 ARCHIVES OF FAMILY 
MEDICINE (2000), http://archfami.ama-assn.org/issues/v9n3/ffull/foc9054.html.  
Although the data source is not disclosed, the Americans for Long-Term Care 
Security Website includes a “Future Costs Calculator” that estimates the cost of 
long-term care based on gender, age and state, at http://www.ltcweb.org.  For 
example, the estimated cost of long-term care for a male, aged 40, living in 
Tennessee is $144,709.80. 
 39. See, e.g., In re Shah, 694 N.Y.S.2d 82, 86 (App. Div. 1999) (stating costs are 
“astronomical”), aff’d 711 N.Y.S.2d 824, 832 (2000) (describing medical treatment 
as “ruinously expensive”); In re Tyler, 2002 WL 1274125, at *10 (D.C. Super. May 
30, 2002) (citing Shah in recognizing ruinously expensive cost of long-term care, 
but denying a community spouse’s petition - without prejudice to refile with 
additional evidence - where she sought to transfer her incompetent husband’s 
assets to herself in a support context). 
 40. DANA SHILLING, FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE OLDER CLIENT 109 (5th ed. 
2001). 
 41. AARP, THE COSTS OF LONG-TERM CARE: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS VERSUS 
REALITY 24 (2001), http://research.aarp.org/health/ltc_costs.pdf.  A CNA study 
conducted in 2001, surveying 11,126 nursing homes throughout the United States 
concluded that daily charges ranged from $115 to $146 depending on the level of 
care required.  CNA, STUDY FINDS NURSING HOME COSTS STEADILY INCREASING, at 
http://www.cna.com/cna/solutions/html/headline_072501.html (July 25, 2001).  
News stories circulating in March 2002 reported the findings of a survey 
commissioned by GE Long-term Care Insurance of San Rafael.  Those findings 
suggest that the cost of long-term care in certain areas may be substantially higher.  
Nursing home care in the ten most expensive regions of the country can range 
from $79,900 annually in the Philadelphia metro areas to $163,400 in Alaska.  See 
Nursing Home Care Costs top $80,000 a year survey says, E. BAY BUS. TIMES, March 4, 
2002, http://eastbay.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2002/03/04/daily2.html. 
 42. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION ON 
AGING, A PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS: 2001, at 9 (2001), 
http://www.aoa.dhhs.gov/aoa/stats/profile/2001/2001profile.pdf. Over two 
million persons celebrated their 65th birthday in 2000. Id. at 1. Each of those 
persons has a life expectancy of an additional 17.9 years.  Id.  Seventy-six percent 
of older homeowners own homes (a principal subject of Medicaid planning) that 
are paid for, with an average value of $96,442 in 1999. Id. at 10. 
10
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afford long-term care.43  This quandary, need coupled with limited or 
no access, defines the initial role of the elder law attorney.44 
Given the expense of long-term care, many seniors who need 
that care are soon impoverished.  There is only one government 
program to which families can turn for help financing long-term 
care: Medicaid.45  “Medicaid is the major source of financing for 
long-term care for the elderly and for non-elderly persons with 
disabilities.”46  No longer just the safety net for the poor, it is now 
the safety net for America’s middle class seniors.47 
The crisis that long-term care financing imposes is uniquely a 
 
 43. “Most elderly people live on limited incomes and few can afford the high 
cost of long-term care.  Medicaid is the safety net because no other practical 
options exist to meet these seniors long-term care needs.”  Medicaid’s Role for 
Seniors: Challenges in a Fiscally Constrained Environment: Testimony given for “The 
Economic Downturn and Its Impact on Seniors”, Special Committee on Aging, United States 
Senate 2 (2002) (statement of Barbara Lyons, Deputy Director of The Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured), at http://www.kff.org.  Of note, 
Medicare and Medicaid were created as a response to a shift in insurance pricing 
practices.  Insurance companies shifted from community rating, which was more 
favorable to high risk insureds, to experience ratings.  As a result, policy premiums 
rose for the elderly and disabled, putting the cost of insurance beyond reach. 
BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 14, 157. 
 44. A 1995 survey found that many elder persons go without care due to its 
expense, lack of available services, and lack of eligibility for government benefits 
that would provide care.  Judith Feder et al., Long-Term Care in the United States: An 
Overview, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS, May-June 2000, at 40, 47.  We note that elder self 
neglect is a serious problem which can be triggered by confusion.  See THE 
NATIONAL CENTER ON ELDER ABUSE AT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC HUMAN SERVICES 
ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL ELDER ABUSE INCIDENCE STUDY: FINAL REPORT 
SEPTEMBER 1998, at 4-33 (1998), http://www.aoa.gov/abuse/report/main-pdf.htm.  
By clearing up confusion regarding the availability of health care resources, elder 
law attorneys may help prevent self-neglect.  See id. 
 45. Medicare funding for long-term care is subject to limiting criteria.  When 
it is available, it is limited to 100 days of coverage.  42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(2)(A) 
(1994); JUDITH A. STEIN & ALFRED J. CHIPLIN, 2002 MEDICARE HANDBOOK § 3.02 
(2002). 
 46. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID FACTS, MEDICAID’S ROLE IN LONG-TERM 
CARE (2001), http://www.kff.org/content/2001/2186/2186.pdf. 
 47.  
[C]ontrary to the perceptions of some, Medicaid is not just a lifeline 
for America’s poorest citizens.  Rather, for America’s seniors, Medicaid 
is now also very much a middle class program.  Funded jointly by the 
states and the federal government, Medicaid today pays nearly two-
thirds of all nursing home and long-term care bills.  So when Medicaid 
is in trouble, so too is middle America. 
The Economic Downturn & Its Effects on Seniors, Testimony to the Senate Special Committee 
on Aging (2002) (opening statement of U. S. Senator Larry Craig, Ranking 
Member of the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging), 
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr79lc.htm. 
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middle-class problem.48  This is true because Medicaid pays only for 
persons who meet the program’s strict limitations on assets and 
income.  Those who elect not to rely on Medicaid either have 
sufficient assets to pay for their long-term care or have purchased 
long-term care insurance to shift the cost to an insurance company.  
Most middle-class persons who are facing a lengthy nursing home 
stay do not have these options, however.  They face the prospect of 
depleting their lifetime savings to pay for nursing home care.  
Once they deplete their assets, known as “spend-down,” they are 
“poor enough” to qualify for Medicaid.49  Middle-class people don’t 
want to pay the nursing home, and they don’t want to be poor 
either.  So what do they do?  To avoid this harsh result, they engage 
in Medicaid planning, to protect their assets for the benefit of 
themselves, their spouses, and their heirs.  Because Medicaid is 
means-tested, Medicaid planning is the process of helping clients 
“rearrange” their assets so as to qualify for Medicaid nursing home 
benefits.  This is done by helping the client meet Medicaid’s 
seemingly inscrutable eligibility rules50 by putting assets out of the 
reach of the Medicaid program (and, often, out of the legal reach 
of the client himself).  Effective Medicaid planning shifts the cost 
of long-term care from the Medicaid applicant to the government 
(in other words, to the taxpayers). 
 
 48. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ELDER LAW ATTORNEYS, WHITE PAPER ON REFORMING 
THE DELIVERY, ACCESSIBILITY AND FINANCING OF LONG-TERM CARE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (2000) [hereinafter NAELA WHITE PAPER], http://www.naela.org. 
 49. ALECXIH & KENNELL, supra note 10. 
At an average national cost of $51,000 per year for long-term care 
services and supports an individual or family cannot maintain 
economic security even if they are prepared for retirement.  
Unfortunately, most Americans are unaware of how long-term care is 
paid for in this country.  They do not realize until it’s too late that we 
use Medicaid, a welfare program that requires them to spend down 
their assets in order to receive assistance with staggering costs. 
Senator David Durenberger, Chairman, Citizens for Long-term Care, Statement 
(Apr. 7, 1999), http://www.citizensforltc.org/speeches.htm. 
 50. The federal and state Medicaid statutes have been described as the 
regulatory equivalent of the “Serbonian bog.”  See John Milton, Paradise Lost, in 
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD; 32 JOHN MILTON, Bk. 2, at 124 (Robert 
Maynard Hutchins ed., William Benton 1952) (1667) (“A gulf profound, as that 
Serbonian bog Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old, Where armies whole have 
been sunk.”).  These laws and regulations have also been characterized as “almost 
unintelligible to the uninitiated,” Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977), as an “aggravated assault on the 
English language, resistant to attempts to understand it,” Friedman v. Berger, 409 
F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and as “labyrinthian,” Roloff v. Sullivan, 975 
F.2d 333, 340 n.12 (7th Cir. 1992). 
12
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V. MEDICAID TODAY: A STRAINED SYSTEM 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act on Medical Assistance,51 
commonly called Medicaid, is a cooperative federal-state program 
funded in large part by the federal government and administered 
by the states.52  While state participation is voluntary, participating 
states must adopt plans that comply with certain requirements im-
posed by federal statutes and regulations.53  The program itself is 
“basically administered by each state within certain broad 
requirements and guidelines.”54  As a result, the Medicaid program 
varies considerably from state to state, as well as within each state 
over time.55 
The federal government’s stated goal is 100% access to health 
care.56  Access to long-term care is ensured through Medicaid, 
which is sometimes referred to as the “safety net.”57  Medicaid is the 
largest public source of funding for long-term care in the United 
States.58 
Who pays for long-term care?  The United States Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the largest purchaser of 
health care in the world.59  “Medicare and Medicaid outlays, 
 
 51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396v (1994). 
 52. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n.1 (1985). 
 53. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990). 
 54. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 885 F.2d 11, 15 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 55. Medicaid is discussed exhaustively in every major elder law treatise.  For 
more information, the federal government’s explanation of Medicaid is available 
at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/medicaid.htm. 
 56. See HEALTHY PEOPLE I, supra note 28, § 1-3; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CLOSING THE HEALTH GAP, at 
http://www.healthgap.omhrc.gov (last visited July 20, 2002). 
 57. “These people are the most needy in the country and it is appropriate for 
medical care costs to be met, first, for these people.”  Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 
569, 590 (1982) (viewing a congressional decision to distribute public assistance 
benefits on the basis of income and resources as “rational”). 
 58. Medicaid is the largest source of funding for medical and health-related 
services for America’s poorest people.  HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, 
MEDICAID: A BRIEF SUMMARY, at http://hcfa.gov/pubforms/actuary/ 
ormedmed/default4.htm (last visited July 20, 2002); see also Long Term Care: Aging 
Baby Boom Generation Will Increase Demand and Burden on Federal and State Budgets: 
Testimony to the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate 4 (2002)(statement of 
David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States) (noting in 2000, 
Medicaid paid for 45% of total long-term care expenditures) [hereinafter Long 
Term Care], http://www.gao.gov.  It is described as “one of the pillars that holds up 
the American health care system.”  ACADEMY FOR HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH AND 
HEALTH POLICY, STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES, STATE OF THE STATES 5 (2002) 
(quoting Sara Rosenbaum); see also NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 3. 
 59. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, HCFA FINANCIAL 
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including State funding, represent thirty-three cents of every dollar 
spent on health care in the United States—fifty-eight cents of every 
dollar spent on nursing homes, forty-eight cents of every dollar 
received by U.S. Hospitals, and twenty-seven cents of every dollar 
spent on physician services.”60  At present, Medicare and Medicaid 
pick up fourteen percent and forty-five percent of the tab for total 
long-term care expenditures respectively.61  An additional three 
percent is paid through other public programs, with the remainder 
coming from private sources.62  Medicaid expenditures will total 
$245 billion in FY 2002, compared with $230 billion for Medicare.63  
Medicaid expenditures will increase from $228,026,089,368 in FY 
200164 and $206,083,216,717 in FY 2000.65 
Spending on long-term care is on an upward spiral, and there 
is no ceiling in sight.  From 1987 to 1996, annual nursing home 
expenses in the United States increased from $28 billion to $70 
billion, and the cost per resident day increased from $56 to $118.66  
By 2000, annual spending on long-term care (which includes non-
 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2000, at v (2001) [hereinafter HCFA FINANCIAL REPORT], 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov.  HCFA is now Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
or “CMS.” 
 60. Id. at 1; cf. JONATHAN GRUBER, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 
MEDICAID 17-19, 21-22 (2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7829. 
 61. Long Term Care, supra note 58, at 4; see also Medicaid Financial Management: 
Better Oversight of State Claims for Federal Reimbursement Needed: Testimony Before the 
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental 
Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 107th Cong. 3 
(2002) (statement of Linda M. Calbom, Director, Financial Management and 
Assurance) (reporting that between 1992 and 2000, the federal share of Medicaid 
rose seventy-four percent, from $69 billion to $120 billion), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02706t.pdf. 
 62. Long-Term Care, supra note 58, at 4. 
 63. Id.  In FY 2002, Medicaid will serve 44.7 million persons; by comparison, 
Medicare will serve 40 million.  Id.  The CBO projects the average annual rate of 
growth in Medicaid spending as 9.5% for FY 2001-2002 and as 8.5% for fiscal years 
2002-2012. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2003-2012, at 69, Table 4-2 (2002) [hereinafter BUDGET 
AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK], available at http://www.cbo.gov. 
 64. See FY 2001 NET REPORTED MEDICAID AND SCHIP EXPENDITURES (2002), 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/totexp01.pdf. 
 65. See NET REPORTED MEDICAID AND SCHIP EXPENDITURES, FY 2002, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/totexp00.pdf.  In FY 1999, the number was 
$189,861,201,380.  See NET REPORTED MEDICAID AND SCHIP EXPENDITURES FY 1999, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/totexp99.pdf. By way of contrast, in 1965, 
combined spending on the programs that became Medicaid was $1.3 billion.  
GRUBER, supra note 60, at 2-3. 
 66. MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY, NURSING HOME EXPENSES, 1987 AND 
1996, at 6 (2001), http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/papers/cb6_01-0029/cb6.pdf. 
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nursing home care) increased to $137 billion.  By 2011, long-term 
care spending is projected to be $237 billion. “By 2030,” says the 
Congressional Budget Office, “the number of workers is expected 
to rise by only 15% while the number of Social Security and 
Medicare beneficiaries will nearly double.  That growth, combined 
with increases in life expectancy, will boost spending on long-term 
care, about half of which is financed by Medicare and Medicaid.”67  
The cost just for the elderly could reach $379 billion by 2050.68   
Moreover, costs are expected to accelerate during the next decade 
due to expanded eligibility for home- and community-based 
services.69 
In 2000, 281.4 million persons resided in the United States.70  
Thirty-five million (12%) were age sixty-five or older.71  As baby 
boomers (those born from 1946 through 1964) begin qualifying for 
entitlements such as Medicare and Social Security at the end of this 
decade, government budgets will be further strained.72 
Absent reform, spending for net interest, Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid will consume three-quarters of federal 
revenue by 2030.73  Total federal spending on health care is 
projected to increase from 13.4% of GDP in 1999 to 15.9% of GDP 
in 2010.74  Within state budgets, Medicaid is one of the largest 
categories of spending, second only to education.75  Spending 
 
 67. BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 63, at 5; see also NATIONAL 
HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES PROJECTIONS: 2001-2011 (2002), 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/projections-2001/highlights.asp. 
 68. Long-Term Care, supra note 58, at 2.  “In 2000, Medicaid paid 45% (about 
$62 billion) of total long-term care expenditures.” Id. at 4. 
 69. See BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 63, at 76. 
 70. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE: 2000, at 1 (2001), http://www.census.gov. 
 71. Id.  Census data shows that 4.5% of people sixty-five years and older were 
living in nursing homes in 2000.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 65 YEARS AND OVER 
POPULATION: 2000, at 7 (2001), http://www.census.gov.  The U.S. is not alone; one 
in ten persons world-wide is sixty years or older.  Press Release, United Nations 
Releases New Statistics on Population Aging 2 (Feb. 28, 2002), 
http://www.un.org/ageing/note5713.doc.htm.  Over 12 million people in the 
United States need long-term care.  KAISER COMMISSION, MEDICAID’S ROLE IN LONG-
TERM CARE 1 (2001), http://www.kff.org.  Most people who need long-term care 
receive it at home or in the community.  About 12% are in nursing homes.  “Of 
the 1.3 million elderly in nursing homes, half are over the age of 85.”  Id. 
 72. Although the elderly and disabled comprise 28% of Medicaid enrollees, 
they account for 67% of program spending.  See HCFA FINANCIAL REPORT, supra 
note 59, at 7. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress, 145-46 
(Feb. 2002), http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2003/pdf/2002_erp.pdf. 
 75. VERNON K. SMITH, NATIONAL GOVERNOR’S ASSOCIATION, MAKING MEDICAID 
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growth, particularly in costs for nursing homes and community-
based programs, has triggered fiscal crises in many states.76 
The cost of long-term care will be ultimately born by taxpayers 
regardless of whether care is provided privately or through a public 
delivery system.77  To maintain care at present levels, the “graying of 
America” will force the market to devote a higher percentage of 
labor to the delivery of long-term care, thereby adding to the 
burden of the nation’s long-term care costs.  We cannot measure 
that cost in dollar terms.  The real cost is the lost opportunity of 
placing that labor elsewhere. Twenty to thirty years from now, will 
there be enough workers to care for America’s elderly?78 
VI. MEDICAID STEPS IN 
Need for Medicaid is determined on a case-by-case basis, using 
eligibility criteria that initially divide recipients into three groups: 
(i) mandatory categorically needy; (ii) optional categorically needy; 
and (iii) medically needy.79 
To become eligible for Medicaid nursing-home benefits, the 
applicant demonstrates categorical eligibility by showing that he or 
she is:  (i) aged sixty-five years or older;80 (ii) a United States 
citizen, a lawfully admitted alien, or an alien permanently residing 
in the United States under color of law;81 (iii) a resident of the state 
where the Medicaid application is filed;82 and (iv) confined 
 
BETTER: OPTIONS TO ALLOW STATES TO CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE AND TO BRING THE 
PROGRAM UP TO DATE IN TODAY’S HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE 3 (2002), available at 
http://www.nga.org/cda/files/MAKINGMEDICAIDBETTER.pdf. 
 76. Id. at 7. 
 77. “[A]ll funds for health services ultimately come from private households, 
regardless of whether they flow through government, business, or charities.”  
Stone, supra note 31, at 953. 
 78. Growth of the pool of available health care workers has not kept pace 
with the pool of prospective long-term care residents. See ROBYN I. STONE, LONG-
TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY WITH DISABILITIES: CURRENT POLICY, EMERGING 
TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 31 (2000) (noting there 
is a current shortage of doctors with training to meet the needs of the elderly; the 
problem will worsen in the future; there are similar shortages in the nursing and 
paraprofessional labor pools), http://www.milbank.org/0008stone/. 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (1994); HFCA’S STATE MEDICAID MANUAL, § 
3601 (1997), http://www.cms.hhs.gov/pubforms/pub45/pub_45.htm; see also 
JANE PERKINS & SARAH SOMERS, NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, AN ADVOCATE’S 
GUIDE TO THE MEDICAID PROGRAM 3.3 (2001). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b)(1) (1994); 42 C.F.R § 435.520 (2001). 
 81. 42 C.F.R. § 435.406 (2001). 
 82. 42 C.F.R. § 435.403 (2001). 
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continuously to a medical institution for thirty days prior to 
attaining Medicaid eligibility.83  In addition, the applicant must be 
financially eligible (poor enough).84  In general, the applicant’s 
income cannot exceed 300% of the current SSI benefit amount,85 
and resources must not exceed those applicable to SSI applicants.  
The SSI rules divide resources (or assets) into two categories: 
countable and excluded.86  Excluded assets are the home, 
household goods, a car, a burial plot and irrevocable prepaid burial 
contract, a nominal life insurance policy, and very little else.87  
Countable assets—essentially, whatever is left—must be “spent 
down” to Medicaid’s resource limit ($2000 in most states).  The 
applicant may instead give away his assets, voluntarily 
impoverishing himself, in the hopes of attaining Medicaid 
eligibility.  Doing this without counsel is like walking through a 
minefield blindfolded. 
Any transfer of assets by a Medicaid applicant (or his spouse) 
invokes the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, which places limits on 
voluntary impoverishment for the purpose of becoming Medicaid 
eligible.88  Section 1396p(c)(1) requires that states impose periods 
of ineligibility for asset transfers made either without consideration 
or for less than fair market value during a pre-application time 
called the “look back period.”89  The look back period is thirty-six 
months, or sixty months in the case of transfers to or from certain 
trusts.90 
Interestingly, not every transfer for less than fair market value 
will result in the imposition of a period of Medicaid ineligibility. 
Congress has created numerous exceptions to the transfer penalty 
rules.  No penalty is applied with respect to transfers of any 
 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(V) (1994). 
 84. See TIMOTHY L. TAKACS, ELDER LAW PRACTICE IN TENNESSEE § 5-5(a) (1998). 
 85. 42 C.F.R. § 435.1005 (2001). Typically, persons who qualify for SSI are 
also eligible for Medicaid.  Some states, called “209(b) States,” use more restrictive 
criteria than those applicable to current SSI applicants.  To further the objective 
of brevity, see PERKINS & SOMERS, supra note 79, at 3.6 for a discussion of the 209(b) 
rules. 
 86. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201 (2001) (countable resources) with 20 C.F.R. 
§ 416.1210 (2001) (excluded resources). 
 87. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1210. 
 88. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, TRANSFERS OF ASSETS, at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/obs8.htm (last visited July 20, 2002). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1) (1994). 
 90. Id.  Section 1396p(d) discusses how trusts are to be treated under the Act, 
particularly with respect to the transfer of asset provisions in subsection (c). 
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resource:91 
• To a spouse, or to a third party for the sole benefit of the 
spouse;92 
• From a spouse to a third party for the sole benefit of the 
spouse;93 
• To a blind or permanently and totally disabled child, or to a 
trust established solely for the benefit of such child;94 or 
• To a trust established solely for the benefit of a disabled 
person under the age of sixty-five (65).95 
Nor is there a penalty when the principal residence is 
transferred to: 
• The individual’s spouse;96 
• A child under the age of twenty-one (21); 
• A child who is blind; 
• A child who is permanently and totally disabled;97 
• A sibling who has an equity interest in the residence and who 
resided in the home for at least a year prior to the applicant’s 
institutionalization;98 or 
• A child who resided in the home for at least two years prior 
to the applicant’s institutionalization and who provided care to 
the individual, thereby permitting the individual to remain at 
home instead of going to a nursing home.99 
Transfers do not trigger a period of ineligibility where the 
transfer is for a purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid,100 or 
 
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2) (1994). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) (1994); see Pacente v. Jindal, 751 So.2d 
343, 344-46 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (stating transfer of an annuity by the annuitant to 
his wife, but if she dies to his son “for as long as the Annuitant lives” held to be a 
transfer “for the sole benefit of the spouse.”) 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i) 
(1994). 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). 
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(iii) (1994). 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(iv) (1994). 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(i) (1994). 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1994). 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1994). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(A)(iv) (1994); see Scinto v. Rowe, No. CV 
930308973, 1995 WL 31091, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 1995).  Here, 
although he had provided primary care to his mother, the son failed to prove that 
the care avoided institutionalization for two years.  Id. at *2. 
 100. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(i) (1994); see Pentuik v. Florida Dept. of 
Health & Rehabilitative Serv., 584 So.2d 1098, 1098-1101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).  
In this case, the Medicaid applicant transferred assets the day before undergoing 
surgery because he believed the operation would kill him.  This was determined 
not a transfer in order to qualify for Medicaid.  Id. at 1101.  Because, ipso facto, 
18
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where the applicant intended to exchange the asset for fair market 
value.101  Nor is a period of ineligibility imposed where the trans-
ferred assets are returned,102 or where imposition of a penalty 
would cause undue hardship.103 
So, for example, an individual may transfer all of his countable 
assets to his disabled child without penalty.  Note that the disabled 
child does not have to demonstrate a need for the assets: that is, 
Medicaid does not require an asset test of the disabled child to 
make the transfer non-disqualifying.104 
An individual who owns a $500,000 home may qualify for 
Medicaid provided he meets all other criteria for eligibility.  The 
theory is that when the Medicaid recipient’s health improves, he 
should have a home to return to; he should not have to sell it to 
pay for his nursing home care.  This benefit is largely illusory, 
however.  Because Medicaid limits the assets and income that the 
Medicaid recipient may retain, there are seldom enough assets or 
income available to keep up the house—that is, pay property taxes, 
insurance, utilities, and the like.  As a result, the burden of keeping 
up the house usually falls upon the Medicaid recipient’s family.  
Furthermore, upon the death of Medicaid recipients age fifty-five 
or older, states are required to seek recovery of Medicaid payments 
from the individual’s estate for nursing facility services, home and 
community-based services, and related hospital and prescription 
drug services.  States have the option of recovering payments for all 
other Medicaid services provided to these individuals.105  This is 
called “estate recovery.”106 
Courts and commentators have discussed the purpose of estate 
recovery statutes.  The California Supreme Court has observed that 
estate recovery programs serve the purpose of permitting a state to 
assist those in need, while easing the financial burden of doing so 
by recouping benefits from a recipient’s estate, thereby preventing 
heirs of the recipient “from unfairly benefiting from the 
 
exempt assets are not counted, a transfer of an exempt asset other than the prin-
cipal residence is not disqualifying.  Id. at 1100. 
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(ii) (1994). 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(C)(iii) (1994). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(D) (1994). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (1994). 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B) (1994). 
 106. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, ESTATE RECOVERY 
PROVISION, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/obs1.htm (last visited July 20, 
2002). 
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program.”107  The Minnesota Supreme Court has characterized the 
Medicaid estate recovery program as a means “whereby money paid 
to qualified individuals for health care purposes may be recovered 
and reused to help other similarly situated persons.”108  A 
commentator has noted that “[t]he foremost consideration behind 
estate recovery is the reduction of the overall cost of Medicaid to 
states by recouping some portion of Medicaid expenditures.”109 
The practice is not without its critics.  U.S. Senator Russell 
Feingold, D-Wis., has described estate recovery as the real death tax 
because it effectively imposes a 100% estate tax on the country’s 
most vulnerable citizens.110  Some states object to estate recovery.  
Texas, Michigan, and Georgia have informed federal officials of 
their intention not to participate in estate recovery efforts, 
apparently without repercussion.111  Trying a similar gambit has 
failed the state of West Virginia, at least to date.  The Governor, 
Attorney General, and a Congressman publicly oppose estate 
recovery but have been told that unless the state continues its estate 
recovery program, the federal government would withhold 
Medicaid funds for long-term care services.  West Virginia’s 
opposition to Medicaid estate recovery was featured on the front 
page of USA Today.  According to USA Today, “A year after 85-year-
old Aunt Rose died, [her niece] got a letter from a collection 
agency saying her aunt’s estate owed Medicaid $51,000.”  Aunt 
Rose bequeathed her home, which apparently was all she had left, 
to her niece.  Now Medicaid is trying to take the house unless the 
niece comes up with the money.112  West Virginia argued 
unsuccessfully to a federal district court that Congress 
 
 107. Kizer v. Hanna, 767 P.2d 679, 681 (Cal. 1989). 
 108. In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 1986). 
 109. Jon M. Zieger, The State Giveth and the State Taketh Away: In Pursuit of a 
Practical Approach to Medicaid Estate Recovery, 5 ELDER L.J. 359, 374 (1997). 
 110. Sen. Feingold proposed a Medicaid amendment on May 21, 2001, which 
would have eliminated estate recovery.  147 CONG. REC. S5406 (daily ed. May 22, 
2001).  The amendment was defeated on a procedural challenge.  147 CONG. REC. 
S5229 (daily ed. May 21, 2001). 
 111. ELDERLAWANSWERS.COM, W. VA. LOSES LATEST ROUND IN EFFORT TO BLOCK 
ESTATE RECOVERY, http://www.elderlawanswers.com/news/XcNewsPlus.asp? 
cmd=view&articleid=162 (citing Laura Parker, West Virginia Fights Law that Makes 
Heirs Sell Homes to Pay Off Medicaid Bill, USA TODAY, May 1, 2002, at 1A, 
http://www.usatoday.com/usatonline/20020501/4073417s.htm) (last visited May 
28, 2002). 
 112. See Laura Parker, Medicaid Patient Dies: Who Gets the House?, USA TODAY, 
May 1, 2002, at 1A, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2002/05/01/usatcov-
medicaid.htm. 
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unconstitutionally coerces the states to implement estate recovery 
programs as a condition to receiving federal Medicaid funds.113  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against West Virginia on 
May 7, 2002.114 
A.  What is Medicaid Planning? 
Effective Medicaid planning guides the applicant through the 
minefield of potential ineligibility.  The effective Medicaid planner 
helps an applicant preserve assets, while fitting within the financial 
criteria for Medicaid eligibility.  A typical Medicaid plan calls for 
the applicant to transfer assets to other persons, thereby artificially 
“impoverishing” the applicant.  He is then “needy” enough to 
qualify for Medicaid.  Medicaid planning also helps applicants plan 
around estate recovery issues.  As a consequence, the cost of the 
Medicaid recipient’s long-term care is shifted to the state.115 
Often, too, Medicaid planning is an explicit attempt to shift 
from a private pay package of health care benefits to a “Medicaid-
Plus” benefits package.  Theoretically, “individuals cannot purchase 
a supplement to Medicaid.”116  This is true, in part, because 
Medicaid recipients (who do not plan) cannot qualify for program 
benefits until they have exhausted their personal resources.  It is 
also true because providers are proscribed from charging 
additional fees for covered services.117  However, effective Medicaid 
planning can result in the creation of a pool of protected assets 
that a family member uses to pay for goods and services that 
Medicaid does not pay for, such as dental care or sitters, thereby 
 
 113. W. Va. ex rel. McGraw v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 
132 F. Supp. 2d 437, 437 (S.D. W.Va. 2001). 
 114. W. Va. ex rel. McGraw v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Serv., 
289 F.3d 281, 281 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 115. Ultimately, whether government (taxpayers) should fund health care is a 
policy decision that remains controversial.  LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE 
MYTH OF OWNERSHIP 5 (2002).  It is apparent, given the cost, that no individual 
consumer can fund the cost of America’s public health infrastructure, which must 
be maintained “at the ready” to be effective.  Further complicating matters, the 
public health infrastructure must be maintained to meet potential but unknown 
future demands for services.  One can argue (and we do), that under these 
circumstances, the cost of the public health infrastructure is an appropriate 
subject for “government intervention.”  Id. at 6. 
 116. GRUBER, supra note 60, at 28. Even in non-Medicaid contexts, 
supplements remain controversial because they may allow certain users of health 
care services to jump to the front of the line. CUTLER, supra note 32, at 70-71. 
 117. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(3) (2001). 
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improving the Medicaid recipient’s health and enhancing his 
quality of life.118 
B.  Objections to Medicaid Planning 
Medicaid planning is legal.  It is not uncontroversial, however.  
A number of objections have been posed to Medicaid planning.  
Seemingly, these objections stem from divergent views concerning 
whether some higher moral rule, beyond the law, should guide 
citizens who participate in the health care market system.119  
Assuming America retains a free-market health care system (as 
opposed to moving toward universal health care), these criticisms 
are largely irrelevant to the extent they urge elders to refrain from 
self-interested conduct, while other market players, such as health 
care providers and insurers, remain free to condition health care 
access on payment (and profit). 
Common Objection 1.  Medicaid is for “the poor,” not for 
those who voluntarily impoverish themselves to qualify for benefits.  
Transferring assets to qualify for benefits is against public policy as 
demonstrated by repeated acts of Congress to put a stop to it.  In 
1982, Congress enacted additional penalties for transferring assets 
and, for the first time, authorized states to impose Medicaid 
ineligibility periods and initiate estate recovery efforts.  In 1985, 
Congress restricted the use of certain types of trusts, such as the 
“Medicaid Qualifying Trust.”  In 1988, Congress added to the 
length of the penalty period and eliminated exceptions to the asset 
transfer rules (although at the same time adding protections for 
the spouses of nursing home residents).  In 1993, Congress further 
tightened up the asset transfer rules and made estate recovery 
mandatory.  In 1996 Congress made transferring assets in order to 
 
 118. 42 C.F.R. § 483.12(d)(3)(i) (2001). 
 119. Compare Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory, with Jules L. Coleman & Brian 
Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
233-60 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).  Natural law theorists hold that a higher law 
exists against which society’s law can be judged, while legal positivists generally 
hold that the law is fundamentally a social fact and that no connection exists 
between it and morality.  Bix, supra, at 223.  The other philosophic camp many 
American scholars fall into is legal realism, which examines, not the law as a 
principle, but what judges actually do with the law.  Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in 
A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 261-79 (Dennis Patterson 
ed., 1996).  Given the natural inclination virtually all persons have toward 
protecting their assets, our approach could be labeled “positive realism” given our 
discussion of MRPC.  See MRPC, supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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qualify for Medicaid a crime; in 1997, this was changed to make 
advising persons to transfer assets a crime.120 
Common Objection 2.  Medicaid’s eligibility criteria were put 
in place to ensure that only the truly needy obtain benefits. They 
were not put in place to enable the taxpayers to subsidize 
inheritances for the Medicaid recipient’s children.121 
Common Objection 3.  If left unchecked, Medicaid planning 
will bankrupt the program.122  Low Medicaid reimbursement rates 
to nursing homes contribute to the understaffing and other 
problems nursing homes face in delivering quality care to their 
residents.  The result will be a two-tier system of long-term care: 
one for wealthy people who pay privately in private-pay-only 
facilities, and the other for poor people in substandard, Medicaid-
only nursing homes. 
Common Objection 4.  Children who engage in Medicaid 
planning for their parents are depriving them of good care.  If 
indeed this assumption is true -- beneficiaries of Medicaid nursing 
home benefits receive poorer care than those who pay privately -- 
 
 120. Popularly known as “Granny’s Lawyer Goes to Jail,” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7b(a)(6) provides: 
Whoever for a fee knowingly and willfully counsels or assists an 
individual to dispose of assets (including by any transfer in trust) in 
order for the individual to become eligible for medical assistance 
under a State plan under subchapter XIX of this chapter, if disposing 
of the assets results in the imposition of a period of ineligibility for 
such assistance under section 1396(p)(c) of this title, shall . . . be guilty 
of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof fined not more than 
$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. 
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(6) (1997).  In 1998 the United States was enjoined from 
enforcing this statute, which, while technically still on the books, makes such 
counseling illegal. The provision was declared to be an unconstitutional limitation 
on free speech.  N.Y. Bar Ass’n v. Janet Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710, 710 (N.D.N.Y. 
1998).  In a March 11, 1998 letter, Attorney General Janet Reno informed the 
Speaker of the House and the Vice President of the United States that the Justice 
Department would not enforce the statute because “the counseling prohibition . . . 
is plainly unconstitutional under the First Amendment . . . .”  Letter from Janet 
Reno, U.S. Attorney General, to Newt Gingrich, Speaker of the U.S. House of 
Representatives (Mar. 11, 1998), http://www.seniorlaw.com/reno.htm. 
 121. “Allowing states to recover from the estates of persons who previously 
received assistance furthers the broad purpose of providing for the medical care of 
the needy; the greater amount recovered by the state allows the state to have more 
funds to provide future services.”  Belshe v. Hope, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 917, 925 (Ct. 
App. 1995). 
 122. “The Medicaid program would be at fiscal risk if individuals were 
permitted to preserve assets for their heirs while receiving Medicaid benefits from 
the state.”  Forsyth v. Rowe, 629 A.2d 379, 385 (Conn. 1993). 
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under this view a child’s effort to accelerate Medicaid eligibility for 
a helpless parent who does not know any better would be immoral. 
Common Objection 5.  Medicaid planning (that is, transfer of 
assets) engaged in by children with their parents’ money is the 
moral equivalent of elder financial abuse.123  In some instances, the 
elderly person is exploited by relatives, who would rather see the 
family fortune in their pockets than utilized for the elder’s nursing 
home care.  The elder is often unaware of the planning and 
transferring of assets or is not informed fully of the impact of being 
on public benefits. 
Common Objection 6.  In a health care system of limited 
resources, Medicaid planning will lead to a deprivation of health 
care from the truly needy, those who are really poor, not those who 
have artificially impoverished themselves in order to qualify for 
Medicaid.  Medicaid planning may be legal, but it is against public 
policy.124 
Common Objection 7.  Medicaid planning discourages people 
from purchasing long-term care insurance or saving to pay their 
own long-term care costs.125 
Common Objection 8.  Those who can pay privately have a 
civic duty to do so, even if they could legally shift the cost to the 
Medicaid program, so as to preserve Medicaid benefits for those 
who are in genuine need. 
Many elder law attorneys are sensitive about the public image 
associated with Medicaid planning.  Medicaid planners are often 
 
 123. See Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000) (noting that courts must retain discretion to respond to abuse). 
 124. See Allen v. Wessman, 542 N.W.2d 748, 753 (N.D. 1996) (“Public policy 
will not allow the social safety net for persons who are old, poor, and unfortunate 
to be exploited by those who are affluent.”); Meyer v. S.D. Dep’t. of Soc. Services, 
581 N.W.2d 151, 156-58 (S.D. 1998); see also Johnson v. Guhl, 166 F. Supp. 2d 42, 
51 (D.N.J. 2001) (“HCFA’s position does not frustrate Congress’ intent in enacting 
the MCCA to enable the community spouse to live above the poverty level.  
Instead, it ensures that Medicaid, as it was intended, helps the truly needy and 
furthers the legislature’s intent to ‘require couples to bear a reasonable amount of 
the costs of institutionalized care and thus preserve Medicaid resources.’”). 
 125. Impoverishment of applicants under the current system will encourage 
future Medicaid applicants to purchase long-term care insurance.  See JOSHUA M. 
WIENER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATE COST CONTAINMENT INITIATIVES 
FOR LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE CRS-21 (2000), 
http://newfederalism.urban.org/pdf/ltcare-initiatives.pdf; see also GRUBER, supra 
note 60 (analyzing the economic decision-making process for consumers); 
CUTLER, supra note 32, at 75 (“[People] might drop their private insurance 
coverage if they are eligible for the public program.”). 
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accused of “gaming the system” for their undeserving and 
overprivileged clients. 
Unfortunately, members of the Medicaid planning bar have 
sometimes been their own worst enemies.  For example, at the May 
1996 Symposium of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, 
two prominent NAELA members (one a former President of the 
organization) gave a presentation on Medicaid planning.  Using 
the format of a skit in which other NAELA members played the 
roles of the family, the presenters took the audience through a 
session in which an elderly couple, whose net worth exceeded 
$750,000, was counseled on how to arrange their affairs to attain 
Medicaid eligibility.  Among the assets in the couple’s portfolio was 
a vacation home.  The skit became fodder for critics of Medicaid 
eligibility planning and indeed was widely criticized by other 
NAELA members. 
We do not address each of these objections in detail.  All 
objections are trumped by our conclusion that the ethical 
implications these objections raise are irrelevant as long as 
Medicaid planning is practiced in an amoral health care market, in 
which the only ethics that count are those of the marketplace. 
C.  Identifying the Stakeholders 
Many stakeholders in the long-term care arena have an interest 
in Medicaid planning.  They include:  (1) the Medicaid applicant 
or recipient; (2) the applicant’s healthy spouse, still living in the 
community; (3) the applicant’s heirs; (4) the government, which 
funds the Medicaid program; (5) health care providers; and (6) the 
insurance industry. 
1.  The Applicant’s Interests 
Surveys show that the general population, which includes the 
pool of potential Medicaid applicants, has a strong aversion to 
nursing home care.126  One study, which surveyed seriously ill 
persons over age seventy, found that twenty-nine percent would 
rather die than go to a nursing home.127  Improving quality of life 
in nursing homes therefore should be viewed as imperative.  Where 
relocation to a long-term care facility is required, older persons 
 
 126. Robert L. Kane & Rosalie A. Kane, What Older People Want from Long-Term 
Care, and How They Can Get It, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 114-115. 
 127. Id. at 115. 
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value kindness, caring, compatibility and responsiveness.128  They 
value private accommodations, as well as control and choice on 
aspects of their daily lives.  Good care furnished in the most 
appropriate setting is a nonnegotiable necessity.129 
But how do they get it?  “Long-term care” includes a broad 
range of expensive health and social services.  Choice in settings in 
which long-term care is delivered is a luxury reserved for the 
wealthy, however, as long as health care remains a commodity 
rather than a right.  After the United States Supreme Court’s 
Olmstead decision,130 home health care options are expanding; 
nonetheless, the Medicaid program remains focused on nursing 
home care as the long-term care option of choice.131  Preserving 
choice for the middle class, to the extent possible, is one interest 
served through effective Medicaid planning. 
Likewise, nursing home residents are concerned about 
retaining enough assets once they leave the nursing home and 
return home.132  In The Changing Profile of Nursing Home Residents: 
1985-1997, researchers found that nursing home residents are 
returning home in increasing numbers.  In 1985, 18% of residents 
were discharged from nursing homes back into the community.  By 
1997, data showed that thirty percent of residents were discharged 
 
 128. Id. at 116. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).  The Olmstead 
decision interpreted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its 
implementing regulation, requiring States to administer their services, programs, 
and activities “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified 
individuals with disabilities.”  Id. at 592.  The federal government has embarked on 
a major initiative to facilitate states’ efforts to comply with the ADA and the 
Olmstead decision.  See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT/OLMSTEAD DECISION, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/olmstead/ 
(last modified May 10, 2002). 
 131. NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 5.  “Despite some recent 
improvements, long-term care continues to pose major challenges: People who 
need long-term care often do not get the care they need or prefer, and families’ 
caregiving and financial burdens are often heavy.”  Feder, supra note 44, at 41.  In 
many states, neither Medicare nor Medicaid will pay for assisted-care living 
services, or the eligibility criteria is so strict that as a practical matter public 
benefits are unavailable to residents of any long-term care facility other than a 
nursing home.  Medicare-funded home health is generally limited to persons who 
are “confined to the home.”  42 C.F.R. § 409.42(a) (2001); STEIN & CHIPLIN, supra 
note 45, § 4.02[A]. 
 132. “Persons who are discharged alive after depleting most of their life’s 
savings may not be able to be financially independent in the community and may 
subsequently become eligible for Medicaid or other forms of public assistance 
(e.g. SSI or food stamps).”  ALECXIH & KENNELL, supra note 10, at 8. 
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because they had recuperated or stabilized.133  There is, however, 
little value in returning home if medical costs, including Medicaid 
“spend down,” have rendered independent living economically 
impossible.  Preserving assets is necessary to enable the individual 
to return home. 
Presumably, everyone has a right to continue living.134  The 
prevailing view, however, is that health care resources are limited 
and, therefore, must be rationed.135  When health care necessary to 
sustain life is rationed (withheld), the effect is passive euthanasia.136  
In a market economy, care is rarely withheld from those with 
means; most commentators agree that ability to pay is a primary 
function of access to health care services.137 
For those who are unable to pay, and the State has promised to 
provide them health care services, 
the demands quickly exceed the ability of the State to 
 
 133. NADINE R. SAHYOUN, ET AL., THE CHANGING PROFILE OF NURSING HOME 
RESIDENTS: 1985-1997 3 (2001), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/agintrends/ 
04nursin.pdf.  From October 1998 to September 1999, 834,000 residents were 
discharged (thirty-three percent of all discharges during that period) after 
recovery or stabilization.  See U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, The 
National Nursing Home Survey: 1999 VITAL & HEALTH STAT. 4 (2002), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_13/sr13_152.pdf.  This should come as 
no surprise.  The stated purpose of nursing home care is to attain and maintain 
the highest practicable level of physical, mental and psycho-social well-being 
possible.  42 C.F.R. § 483.25 (2001); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-108(a)(5) (2001) 
(stating a goal is to return residents home or to a less restrictive environment). 
 134. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (J.W. Gough ed., 
Basil Blackwell 3d ed. 1966) (1690). One author explores a different viewpoint in 
John Hardwig, Is There a Duty to Die, 27 HASTINGS CTR REP., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 34.  
He states “[w]e fear death too much.  Our fear of death has lead to a massive 
assault on it.  We still crave after virtually any life-prolonging technology that we 
might conceivably be able to produce.  We still too often feel morally impelled to 
prolong life – virtually any form of life – as long as possible.  As if the best death is 
the one that can be put off longest.”  Id. at 40. 
 135. See Levy, supra note 23, at 116.  “Rationing may be defined as the de facto 
or de jure allotment or limitation of medical care necessitated by a shortage of 
money available.”  Gregory N. Rutecki, Rationing Medical Care to the Elderly Revisited: 
Futility as a Just Criterion, 7 J. BIBLICAL ETHICS IN MED., Summer 1993, 
http://www.bmei.org/jbem/volume7/num3/ruteki.htm.  See generally, TIMOTHY L. 
TAKACS, HEALTH CARE RATIONING: CHALLENGES FOR THE ELDER LAW ATTORNEY, at 
http://www.tn-elderlaw.com/rationing.html (October 1996). 
 136. “Allowing to die – sometimes called ‘passive euthanasia’ – is already 
accepted as a humane and proper course of action in certain cases.”  SINGER, supra 
note 17, at 209.  For a discussion involving the difference between active and 
passive euthanasia, see id. at 202-13.  The author notes that in traditional Eskimo 
communities, it was custom for a man to kill his elderly parents.  Id. at 217.  
Obviously, the affected elder may wish to have a voice in this decision. 
 137. See e.g., BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 21. 
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supply these services.  When demands exceed the supply, 
what do [policymakers do]?  They limit services in subtle 
ways, such as by (1) requiring more “documentation,” (2) 
limiting the number of hospital beds, (3) demanding 
early discharge, (4) reducing payment for services and 
procedures, (5) requiring more out-patient procedures, 
(6) limiting the number of visits, (7) requiring 
“justification” before payment, (8) establishing stricter 
“Certificate of Need” requirements, (9) increasing taxes, 
(10) accusing the suppliers of services of waste, fraud and 
abuse, etc.  The list is unending but there is never a hint 
that the system is fatally flawed and that the system has 
never worked as promised in any country in which it has 
been tried.138 
So as Medicaid’s fiscal crisis deepens, and one response to 
ameliorating the crisis is to limit services, the elderly have a 
substantial interest in preserving private funds that can be used to 
fund health care “reclassified” by public benefits programs and 
insurance entities as “futile” or “not medically necessary.”139  The 
Medicaid safety net does not pay for those “quality of life” items 
that may make life in a nursing home a little more bearable.  
Medicaid recipients who want decent clothes, dentures, snacks, 
entertainment, books and magazines, and furnishings for their 
rooms have to pay for these things themselves.140  For most, that is 
hardly possible out of the $2000 Medicaid resource limitation and 
the Personal Needs Allowance that they can retain out of their 
monthly income (the remainder of which is paid to the nursing 
home, under Medicaid’s share-of-cost requirement). 
 
 138. William H. Tucker, Social Security—Good Concept, Bad Execution, 160 
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2680 (2000). 
 139. See WESLEY J. SMITH, FUTILE CARE THEORY AND MEDICAL FASCISM: THE DUTY 
TO DIE, at http://www.frontpagemag.com/archives/miscellaneous/futile.htm  
(Apr. 9, 2002); CENTER FOR BIOETHICS, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, DISTRIBUTING 
LIMITED HEALTH CARE RESOURCES 2 (1997) (discussing that “health care resources 
are scarce relative to needs” and failure to place limits on delivery of health care 
services would limit other national priorities), http://www.bioethics.umn.edu/ 
publications/Limited_Resources.pdf. Futile treatment is treatment that secures 
biologic survival, but not meaningful recovery or reversal of the condition being 
treated.  Rutecki, supra note 135. 
 140. 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(c)(8)(ii) (2001).  “Nursing home residents also value 
control and choice on aspects of the daily lives, particularly with reference to 
leaving the facility from time to time and telephone and other communication 
with those outside the facility. . . .  The majority [of nursing home residents] place 
a high value on privacy.”  Kane & Kane, supra note 126, at 116.  Medicaid does not 
fund these “luxuries.” See also BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 161. 
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Although a resident’s means should not determine the quality 
of services received, it may.  In July 2000 CMS released phase 1 of 
its report, Appropriateness of Minimum Nurse Staffing Ratios In Nursing 
Homes, which details substandard care in American nursing homes 
and pins the blame primarily on understaffing.141  Persons with 
means can afford to supplement services that nursing homes 
provide, in some instances, transforming substandard care to 
acceptable care.  In other cases, preserved assets may provide 
residents and family members with the means to create a form of 
private quality enforcement; assets may pay for sitters, who can 
serve as private ombudsmen to ensure that essential services are 
provided.142 
In almost every case, when death occurs, the Medicaid 
applicant will want to pass wealth to his heirs, an impulse as old as 
the Bible itself.143  Former President Jimmy Carter says the following 
about his own estate plan: 
One of the most interesting and gratifying responsibilities 
at our age is to decide what to do with accumulated wealth 
and possessions.  In all too many cases, couples fail to 
leave a will of any kind. Whether it’s a few pieces of 
furniture and some personal items or broader holdings of 
stocks and real estate, we should decide what will happen 
to our belongings.  We must remember that, no matter 
what we do, the Internal Revenue Service will be one of 
our major heirs. How much of our estate will go for taxes 
can be greatly affected by whether or not we plan for the 
future. . . .We are leaving a substantial portion of our 
estate to the Carter Center. . . .We have retained an 
interest in some of our bequests, amending the 
arrangements to accommodate changing circumstances 
and sometimes for sentimental reasons.  For instance, we 
have a special feeling about our property around Plains.  
 
 141. Phase I of the Report, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/ 
reports/rp700hmp.asp (July 2000); Phase II, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
medicaid/reports/rp1201home.asp (March 2002); see also MINORITY STAFF, SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, ABUSE OF NURSING HOME RESIDENTS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM IN U.S. 
NURSING HOMES (2001), http://www.house.gov/reform/min/pdfs/pdf_inves/ 
pdf_nursing_abuse_rep.pdf. 
 142. This can be particularly important in areas where local Ombudsmen, for 
whatever reason, are indifferent to substandard care. 
 143. The concept of inheritance is ancient.  Without detailing the breadth of 
the Hebrew notion of “birth-right,” suffice it to say that the notion of passing one’s 
substance to the next generation is also ancient.  See Genesis 27:27. 
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Both Rosalynn’s and my ancestors who were born in the 
1700s are buried there, and most of the land that we own 
was acquired several generations ago. . . .[W]e wish to 
keep intact and owned by our direct descendants.144 
Former President Carter’s description of his estate plan 
underscores the natural inclination we all have toward directing 
how our assets will be distributed (which runs counter to the 
position espoused by critics of Medicaid planning).145  Beyond 
personal and sentimental reasons for controlling the disposition of 
assets, the social significance of inheritance laws was recognized by 
Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in America.  Those who control 
the direction wealth takes as it passes to the next generation have 
immense power.146  Tocqueville observed:  “What is called family 
pride is often founded upon an illusion of self-love.  A man wishes 
to perpetuate and immortalize himself, as it were, in his great-
grandchildren.”147  For middle-class seniors who need long-term 
care, the present Medicaid system is, in effect, a health lottery that 
deprives them of this opportunity.148  No rational person would 
enter such a lottery voluntarily.149 
2.  The Applicant’s Healthy Spouse 
Failure to plan can impoverish the Medicaid applicant’s 
healthy spouse.  A Medicaid applicant is not eligible to receive 
 
 144. CARTER, supra note 20, at 129-30; see also In re Labis, 714 A.2d 335 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (authorizing Medicaid planning transfer in substituted 
judgment/guardianship context because ward would have wanted to provide for 
his wife for life and benefit his children thereafter). 
 145. Indeed, since the natural response of virtually everyone is self 
preservation, one can legitimately question the moral justification, to the extent 
they urge some “higher law,” of the position taken by Medicaid planning critics. 
 146. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 50-51 (Phillips Bradley 
ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1966) (1835). 
 147. Id. at 49. 
 148. The social effect of injecting income into poor families is beyond the 
scope of this article.  However, low income is related to poor material conditions.  
See Michael Marmot, The Influence of Income on Health: Views of an Epidemiologist, 21 
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 31, 32.  Marmot speculates that a threshold 
exists below which material conditions such as clean water, good sanitation, 
adequate nutrition, adequate housing and warmth are not accessible.  Above the 
threshold, although there are still differing opportunities for social participation, 
the differences in material conditions no longer have a plausible connection with 
pathology.  For additional information on the status of poor families, see POLICY 
ANALYSIS FOR CALIFORNIA EDUCATION, NEW LIVES FOR POOR FAMILIES?, at 
http://pace.berkeley.edu/pace_new_release.html (2002). 
 149. See Levy, supra note 23, at 114-15. 
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Medicaid if his countable resources exceed $2,000.150  Those assets, 
however, may have been necessary to support his spouse during her 
retirement.  In 1988, Congress enacted the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act (MCCA) “to protect the elderly and disabled 
population from the financial disaster caused by catastrophic 
health care expenditures not currently reimbursed under the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs.”151  Included in MCCA was a 
special section that pertains to Medicaid and the treatment of 
resources and income for spouses.152  Under prior law, nearly all of 
a couple’s assets had to be depleted before a spouse 
institutionalized in a nursing home (the “institutionalized spouse”) 
could become eligible for Medicaid, often resulting in the 
impoverishment of the spouse remaining at home (the 
“community spouse”).  The purpose of MCCA “is to end this 
pauperization by assuring that the community spouse has a 
sufficient—but not excessive—amount of income and resources 
available to her while her spouse is in a nursing home at Medicaid 
expense.”153 
To meet the Congressionally-mandated goal of avoiding 
impoverishment of the community spouse, MCCA provides special 
allowances of assets and income for married couples where one 
spouse resides in a nursing home.  At the time of 
institutionalization, a “snapshot” of the couple’s resources is 
taken.154  The couple’s resources are separated into one of two 
categories, countable and exempt, and a total value of the couple’s 
countable resources is determined.  Countable assets include 
checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit, money 
market funds, stocks and bonds, and other similar assets, whether 
held by them separately or jointly.155 
Of the countable assets, the community spouse is permitted to 
retain what is termed the “community spouse resource 
allowance.”156  Assets that are exempt, such as the couple’s home, 
are not considered when the community spouse resource allowance 
is set.  Of the total countable resources, the community spouse 
 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1994). 
 151. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105, pt. 2, at 65-68 (1998), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N 803, 888. 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (1994). 
 153. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105, supra note 151, at 888. 
 154. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(1)(A) (1994). 
 155. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c) (1994). 
 156. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f)(2) (1994). 
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resource allowance is the greatest of (1) $17,856 (in 2002, adjusted 
annually); (2) the lesser of one-half of the total countable resources 
or $89,280 (in 2002, adjusted annually); (3) an amount established 
pursuant to a fair hearing; or (4) an amount transferred under 
court order.157  All other countable resources above this amount are 
attributed to the institutionalized spouse.158  When the countable 
resources attributed to the institutionalized spouse have been 
appropriately reduced to the Medicaid resource limitation ($2,000 
in most states), the institutionalized spouse is eligible for Medicaid 
nursing home benefits. 
Once eligibility for Medicaid is established, a determination is 
made of the allocation of income to the community spouse.  MCCA 
provides that a community spouse is entitled to a minimum 
monthly maintenance needs allowance (“MMMNA”) to be set by 
the states at 50% above the poverty level for a family of two.159  Post-
eligibility, the income allowance may be deducted from the 
institutionalized spouse’s income that would otherwise be paid to 
the nursing home. 
 
 157. Id.  It is worth noting that the elderly often live on accumulated assets 
because income declines when they leave the workforce.  See ALECXIH & KENNELL, 
supra note 10, at 6.  If this is true, one can argue that the CSRA is woefully 
inadequate.  The 2002 HHS Poverty Guidelines set the poverty level for single 
persons residing in the forty-eight contiguous States at $8,860.  U.S DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 2002 HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES, at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/02poverty.htm (last updated Apr. 24, 2002).  The 
life expectancy for females attaining age 65 is 19.2 years; for males it is 16.3 years.  
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, FAST STATS A TO Z, at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm (last updated June 13, 2002).  At 
age 65, a community spouse who retains the maximum CSRA to pay her living 
expenses at the 2002 poverty level will outlive her money by more than nine years.  
If she requires assisted living (which is not covered by either Medicare or 
Medicaid), the average cost of care is $2,159 per month, or $25,908 per year.  
METLIFE, GENERAL NEWS: 2002 AND 2001 PRESS RELEASES, ASSISTED LIVING AVERAGES 
$2,159 PER MONTH IN U.S. METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE STUDY FINDS, at 
http://www.metlife.com/Applications/Corporate/WPS/CDA/PageGenerator/0,1
674,P250%257ES356,00.html (May 29, 2002).  Even with the maximum CSRA, the 
community spouse will not have sufficient assets to fund assisted living care for 
four years at current rates.  If she requires nursing home care herself, she will have 
insufficient assets to pay for two years of care in virtually all states and, in some 
areas, would have insufficient assets to fund a single year of care.  By way of 
contrast, the CSRA is slightly over one-half the average annual income of 
physicians for one year.  See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TRENDS AND 
INDICATORS IN THE CHANGING HEALTH CARE MARKETPLACE, 2002, at 77 (2002), 
http://www.kff.org/content/2002/3161/marketplace2002_finalc.pdf. 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f). 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(3)(A)(i), (B)(iii) (1994). 
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Medicaid planning, therefore, takes on special urgency, where 
a principal goal of the planning is to preserve assets for the benefit 
of the community spouse.  Arguably, then, any planning within the 
ambit of the rules that results in protecting assets and income for 
the community spouse ought to be largely free from controversy.  
In fact, however, it is not. 
Medicaid planners, seeking to provide community spouses 
with maximum protection, are sometimes accused of exploiting 
loopholes in the law.160  Excess countable resources that would 
otherwise be at risk for the cost of the institutionalized spouse’s 
nursing home care may be spent without limit on exempt resources 
for the community spouse.  One strategy might be for the 
community spouse to purchase a new home–regardless of value.  
The community spouse could purchase a $500,000 home to qualify 
her husband for Medicaid, and then sell or transfer the home post-
eligibility, without affecting his continued eligibility. 
Another popular strategy is to purchase an immediate, 
irrevocable annuity for the benefit of the community spouse.161  
The financial services industry has caught on to this one, and a 
cottage industry of selling “Medicaid friendly” annuities has 
arisen.162  The practice has become so widespread and so 
apparently abusive that courts in New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania163 have severely restricted the strategy, and at least one 
state (Alabama) known to the authors bans their use altogether as a 
strategy to qualify the institutionalized spouse for Medicaid.  Rules 
that would limit or prohibit annuities are under consideration 
elsewhere.164 
A strategy that is popular in New York, but seldom used 
 
 160. See In re Labis, 714 A.2d 335 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). 
 161. Thomas D. Begley, Jr., and Jo-Anne Herina Jeffreys, The Use of Annuities in 
Medicaid Planning: An Update, ELDERLAW REPORT 2001, at 
http://www.njelderlaw.com/library/article_display.asp?ID=43 (last visited July 20, 
2002). 
 162. For an example, see “Medicaid Friendly” annuity, at 
http://www.standardagents.com/product.asp?mid=261 (last visited July 20, 2002). 
 163. Johnson v. Guhl, 166 F. Supp. 2d 42, 58 (D.N.J. 2000); McNamara v. Ohio 
Dep’t. of Human Servs., 744 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Bird v. Pa. 
Dep’t. of Pub. Welfare, 731 A.2d 660, 669 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999). 
 164. See, e.g., LEGISLATIVE SERVICES AGENCY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULE FISCAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT (2001) (discussing Indiana Proposed Rule 01-175), 
http://www.in.gov/legislative/pdf/01175.pdf; see also Sylvia Hsieh, States Crack 
Down on Medicaid Planning, LAW. WKLY., July 9, 2001, http://www.lkrlaw.com/ 
medicaid-planning.htm. 
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elsewhere, is called “spousal refusal.”  Under MCCA, Medicaid 
benefits may not be withheld from the institutionalized spouse 
should the community spouse refuse to make countable resources 
available to him.  Instead, Medicaid has a right to sue the 
community spouse for support, under a theory of subrogation.165 
This results in a predictable pas de deux between the community 
spouse and the State Medicaid agency (at least as practiced in New 
York).  Once institutionalization occurs, the community spouse in 
New York refuses to make the couple’s resources available to pay 
for her husband’s nursing home care; Medicaid pays and bills the 
community spouse at the Medicaid rate, which is usually 
considerably lower than the facility’s private pay rate.  Married 
couples without the benefit of counsel pay the private rate, unless 
they know how spousal refusal works. 
3.  The Applicant’s Heirs 
The interests of the applicant’s heirs are relevant only to the 
extent they support those of the elder.166  About eighty-five percent 
of elders who need long-term care receive it from family and 
friends.167  Today, “an estimated one [in] four U.S. households is 
involved in caring for a loved one aged fifty or older,”168 over 
twenty-two million caregiver households nationwide.169  “[Seven] 
million Americans are caring for a parent at any given time.”170  
The average caregiver age is forty-six, and more than seven of ten 
caregivers are female.171  While the average caregiver provides 
approximately eighteen hours of care each week, one in five 
provides forty or more hours of care each week.172 
 
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(3) (1994). 
 166. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 4, R. 1.2(d) (2002).  We 
omit from this article a discussion of conflicts of interest that typically arise in an 
elder law practice.  For a practical discussion of such conflicts, see any treatise on 
elder law. 
 167. BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 158. 
 168. FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, FACT SHEET: WORK AND ELDERCARE, at 
http://www.caregiver.org/factsheets/work_eldercareC.html. 
 169. NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AARP, FAMILY CAREGIVING IN THE U. 
S.: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 8 (1997), http://caregiving.org/ 
content.reports.finalreport.pdf. 
 170. FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, supra note 168. 
 171. NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 169, at 8. 
 172. Id. at 17.  See also AARP, CAREGIVING & LONG-TERM CARE, at 
http://www.research.aarp.org/health/fs82_caregiving.html (December 2000). 
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Caregiving173 is now “viewed as an unpaid extension of the 
public health system, providing [approximately] $196 billion” in 
uncompensated care annually.174  It should therefore be 
encouraged and supported.  While running for President, then-
Gov. George W. Bush stated: 
A growing number of Americans are making the choice to 
care for loved ones at home.  And many families have 
found that this enriches their lives together--connecting 
the generations . . .and making grandparents a daily 
encouragement to grandchildren, and a regular presence 
in the teaching of values.  We will give extra help to those 
who care for elderly family members at home.175 
The question then is what can be done to support caregivers? 
Financial assistance would help.  Unpaid caregiving is not 
“free.”  Over the course of a caregiving career, caregivers can lose 
as much as $650,000 in wages, Social Security benefits, and 
pensions.176  The cost to employers is estimated at $1,142 in lost 
productivity per year per employee; the Alzheimer’s Association 
estimates that Alzheimer’s disease alone will cost American business 
$61 billion in 2002.177  While it may be impossible to replace lost 
caregiver wages dollar-for-dollar, government could at least 
partially recompense the caregiver by recognizing an exception to 
 
 173. Caregiving is defined as 
providing unpaid care to a relative or friend who is aged fifty or older 
to help them take care of themselves.  Caregiving may include help 
with personal needs or household chores.  It might be taking care of a 
person’s finances, arranging for outside services, or visiting regularly to 
see how they are doing.  This person need not live with you. 
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 169, at 6. 
 174. NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, TOWARD A NATIONAL CAREGIVING 
AGENDA: EMPOWERING FAMILY CAREGIVERS IN AMERICA 2 (2001), 
http://www.caregiving.org/content/reports%5ccaregiver%20summit-1241.pdf. 
 175. GEORGE W. BUSH FACT SHEET, IMPROVING LONG-TERM CARE FOR SENIOR 
AMERICANS (quoting then-Governor George W. Bush), at 
http://www.taxplanet.com/library/bush510/bush510.html (May 10, 2000). 
 176. THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING, supra note 174, at 4. 
 177. FAMILY CAREGIVER ALLIANCE, supra note 168.  The disease will cost 
corporate America $36.5 billion in 2002 for workers who take off time to care for 
Alzheimer’s patients.  That figure includes loss of productivity ($18 billion), 
absenteeism ($10 billion), and hiring temporary workers ($2 billion), among 
other costs.  Health care business costs and research will require an additional 
$24.6 billion, according to the study.  This annual cost is nearly twice as much as 
was estimated in 1998, says the Alzheimer’s Association.  ROSS KOPPEL, 
ALZHEIMER’S ASSOCIATION, ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE: THE COST TO U.S. BUSINESSES IN 
2002, at 2-5 (2002),  http://www.alz.org/media/newsreleases/current/ 
062602ADCosts.pdf. 
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the estate recovery rules for the benefit of an unpaid caregiver, in 
much the same way that states may not recover when there is a 
surviving spouse or a disabled child.  Effective Medicaid planning 
offers a private solution. 
4.  The Government 
On January 23, 2002, Dan L. Crippen of the Congressional 
Budget Office testified before the House Budget Committee.  
Long-term budget pressure is looming just over the horizon, said 
Crippen.   
Those pressures result from the aging of the U.S. 
population (large numbers of baby boomers will start 
becoming eligible for Social Security retirement benefits 
in 2008 and for Medicare in 2011), from increased life 
spans, and from rising costs for federal health care 
programs.  According to midrange estimates, if current 
policies continue, spending on Social Security, Medicare 
and Medicaid combined will nearly double by 2030, to 
almost 15% of GDP.178 
Federal and state governments have yet to shoulder the 
responsibility of delivering, as opposed to financing, health care.  As 
Feder and her colleagues put it, “Medicare and Medicaid policy 
resembles a fiscal tug-of-war, rather than a concerted effort to 
address people’s needs.”179  In 2030, 70 million Americans will be 
65 years of age or older.  Of that number, 8.5 million will have 
attained age 85.180  Experts forecast as many as three million 
nursing home residents in 2030,181 an increase from 1,720,500 in 
2000.182  Who is going to take care of the disabled elderly, and at 
 
 178. The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2003-2012: Before the House 
Comm. on the Budget, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Director, 
Congressional Budget Office), http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=32 
76&sequence=0. 
 179. Feder, supra note 44, at 48. 
 180. SAHYOUN, supra note 133, at 7. 
 181. Id.  A fact statement produced by candidate George W. Bush, Improving 
Long-Term Care for Senior Americans, May 10, 2000, paints a more dire picture.  
Candidate Bush estimated that “between 2000 and 2030, the nursing home 
population will rise from 2.8 million to 5.3 million; total nursing home 
expenditures will rise from $69 million to $330 million.”  GEORGE W. BUSH FACT 
SHEET, supra note 175.  The Bush estimate does not appear to differentiate 
between nursing home residents over 65 years of age, and those under that age. 
 182. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QT-P12. GROUP QUARTERS POPULATION BY SEX, 
AGE, AND TYPE OF GROUP QUARTERS: 2000 (2000), http://factfinder.census.gov/ 
servlet/QTTable?ds_name=D&qr_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_QTP12&_lang=en&g
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what cost? 
One possible solution to government’s long-term care 
financing crisis is to cap prices.183  Another is to internalize the 
delivery of care.  A third is to drastically tighten the criteria for 
Medicaid eligibility, forcing nursing home residents to apply more 
of their private resources to pay for their own care, including 
reliance on unpaid caregivers.  The State of Connecticut, for 
example, has requested a “Section 1115 Medicaid Demonstration 
Waiver” that, if granted by CMS, would allow Connecticut to 
impose a period of Medicaid ineligibility for transfer of assets not 
from the date of the transfer but from the date that the individual 
would otherwise qualify for Medicaid nursing home benefits (that 
is, at the time of application when the applicant is a nursing home 
resident).184  The avowed purpose of the waiver proposal is to 
frustrate those individuals who have the foresight to plan for 
Medicaid eligibility and force them instead to purchase long-term 
care insurance. 
Assuming the U.S. health care system continues to function as 
a market, government could do more than it is presently doing.  It 
could actively participate in the development of a national health 
care agenda (otherwise known as “goals”), and regulate both 
supply and demand to move market participants toward a more 
universal health care system.  Still, government is not a panacea.185  
Governments and markets, according to some experts, work hand-
 
eo_id=01000US&_caller=bfri&_ts=45670541133. 
 183. See U.S. v. Nazon, 940 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming a Medicaid 
fraud conviction, thus illustrating government’s ultimate power to control prices). 
 184. “Through this proposed Demonstration project, the behavioral changes 
of applicants would be evaluated with the expectation that the revised TOA 
[Transfer of Asset] policy would encourage personal responsibility and the use of 
LTC insurance, while also realizing substantial savings to the Medicaid program.”  
For more information about the Connecticut waiver proposal, see the state’s 
Department of Social Services Web site.  STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, TRANSFER OF ASSETS SECTION 1115 & DEMONSTRATION WAIVER 
PROPOSAL 2 (2002),  http://www.dss.state.ct.us/pubs/TOA_proposal.pdf.  
Whether transferring assets adversely affects Medicaid financial stability and 
integrity has not gone unquestioned, however.  Joshua Wiener, for one, who is 
widely acknowledged as an expert in the area of long-term care financing, wrote in 
1998 that while almost all states regard transferring assets as a problem, only a few 
states have elevated it to a major policy concern affecting Medicaid’s fiscal health.  
Joshua M. Wiener and David G. Stevenson, State Policy on Long-Term Care for the 
Elderly, 17 HEALTH AFFAIRS, May-June 1998, at 81, 97, 
http://newfederalism.urban.org/html/haffairs/wiener.pdf. 
 185. Thomas Rice et al., Reconsidering the Role of Competition in Health Care 
Markets: Introduction, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y  & L. 863, 867 (2000). 
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in-hand and need each other.  Government needs markets to help 
ensure that the services produced are the ones that are wanted and 
resources are not unnecessarily squandered.  Markets need 
government to ensure that prices are fair, all segments of the 
population are served, and that objective information is 
disseminated.  Determining the proper blend is the key.186 
5.  Health Care Providers 
Providers of health care—doctors, hospitals, and nursing 
homes—are in business.  Health care in fact is a big business, 
consuming 13.2% of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product in 
2000.187  Even a non-profit hospital must have a stable stream of 
revenue in order to keep the doors open.  This profit-making, or 
revenue-enhancing, objective, founded on the profit motive, puts 
facilities at odds with elders who need health care and may or may 
not have sufficient resources to pay for it.  Should they be entitled 
to it nonetheless, regardless of ability to pay? 
In 1971, Dr. Robert M. Sade expressed the view that medical 
care is not a right.  His argument, premised in free market 
economic theory, is that “the concept of medical care as the 
patient’s right is immoral because it denies the most fundamental 
of all rights, that of a man to his own life and the freedom of action 
to support it.”188  Medical care is a service provided by doctors and 
others to people who wish to purchase it.  According to Sade, now a 
cardiothoracic surgeon and director of the Institute of Human 
Values in Health Care at the Medical University of South Carolina, 
any contrary position would wrongly deprive doctors of the fruit of 
their labor.189  Although Sade argues that his views mirror Locke’s, 
Sade misapprehends Locke.  It is true, as Locke said, that the labor 
of one’s body is his own.  No one compelled Sade to enter the 
healing profession, however.  Sade’s choice dictates that he must 
live with government’s regulation of that profession, whatever form 
that may take.  Sade’s (unstated) view that medicine is a business 
rather than a profession is at the heart of concerns relating to the 
 
 186. Id. at 869. 
 187. Stephen Heffler et al., Health Spending Projections for 2001-2011: The Latest 
Outlook, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 207. 
 188. See Robert Sade, Medical Care as a Right: A Refutation, in ETHICS IN 
MEDICINE 573-580 (Stanley Joel Reiser et al. eds., MIT Press 1977) (1971), available 
at http://www.aapsonline.org/brochures/sademcr.htm. 
 189. See LOCKE, supra note 134. 
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current Medicaid system.  During the 1990s, as Medicaid (and 
other health care financing vehicles) moved from a fee-for-service 
system to a capitated payment system, the potential for profit due 
to increased personal labor evaporated.  Instead, profit is now 
maximized through cost-savings, one method of which is by a 
reduction in services.  This “less is more” approach will not reverse 
itself until professionalism, rather than profit, is paramount. 
On June 14, 1999, the American Academy of Family Physicians 
issued a press release endorsing universal “coverage.”190  This 
proposal, while positive, appears to be premised on continuation of 
the insurance financing model presently in place.  On December 4, 
2001, the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association 
adopted a “Declaration of Professional Responsibility: Medicine’s 
Social Contract with Humanity.”191  The AMA has committed itself 
to “advocate for social, economic, educational and political 
changes that ameliorate suffering and contribute to human well-
being.”192  Nonetheless, a difference of opinion exists concerning 
what this entails. 
6.  Insurers 
In theory, long-term care should be insurable.193  “In fact, the 
need for long-term care is far from a necessary concomitant to 
aging.”194  People in all age groups face a risk they will need long-
term care, although the risk of requiring long-term care does 
increase with age.195  Should this risk be spread through public 
(social) or private insurance, or through a publicly-financed, health 
care delivery system?196  The answer depends in part on who should 
 
 190. See Press Release, American Academy of Family Physicians, All Americans 
Must Have Health Insurance: A Joint Statement (June 14, 1999), 
http://www.aafp.org/news/990614nr.html.  The Statement was joined by the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Emergency Physicians, 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American College of 
Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine, the American College of 
Surgeons, and the American Medical Association. 
 191. http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/upload/mm/369/decofprofessional.pdf. 
 192. Id. Art. VIII. 
 193. NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 2. 
 194. Judith Feder, Long-Term Care: A Public Responsibility, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 
Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 112. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Douglas Clement, Beyond Supply and Demand, FEDGAZETTE (May 2002) 
(“The only guaranteed means of dealing with adverse selection is compelling 
everyone to purchase insurance and insisting that everyone pays their share.  But 
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pay for it, and how much they should pay.  The sick want expansive 
insurance, while the healthy do not (until they get sick).  
Mandatory insurance, essentially a tax, forces the healthy to 
subsidize health care for the unhealthy.197 
The insurance industry, which is profit motivated, insists it can 
meet this need.  It has developed long-term care insurance 
products to enable an individual, for a premium, to transfer the 
risk of the high cost of nursing home care to an insurance 
company.  Medicaid and Medicaid planning pose a risk to the 
insurance industry, however.  If potential policy purchasers can 
secure social insurance (i.e. Medicaid) for less than the cost of 
private insurance, they have no incentive to purchase long-term 
care insurance.198 
In fact, one of the policy issues now under debate is whether 
Medicaid and long-term care insurance can coexist.  Encouraging 
people to purchase private long-term care insurance while working 
to strengthen the public safety net for those who cannot afford it 
probably are incompatible strategies, according to a 1999 study 
sponsored by The Commonwealth Fund.  The Bush 
administration’s policy of promoting the purchase of long-term 
care insurance by giving purchasers tax breaks would erode 
support for efforts to assure access to care for the poor through 
Medicaid or another system, the study’s author contends.199 
Nonetheless, the federal government projects continued 
reliance on an insurance model as the means of providing access to 
health care services.  The assumption underlying this policy is 
 
such ‘universal’ insurance requires government intervention—the opposite of free 
markets — and substantial income redistribution.  Aside from the political 
obstacles to such a policy, universal health insurance incurs the economic 
inefficiencies of taxation, transfers and administrative costs—deadweight losses 
that economists abhor.”), http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/02-
05/supply.cfm.  All insurance contains a subsidy used to finance health care.  The 
subsidy in private insurance is a transfer of resources from the healthy to the poor.  
Social insurance includes the former, but typically adds a transfer from the wealthy 
to the poor as well.  BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 15. 
 197. BODENHEIMER & GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 13, 163.  Others argue, 
however, that no redistributive effect is realized so long as value is returned to 
taxpayers (or policy purchasers).  See Levinson, supra note 33, at 553. 
 198. See CUTLER, supra note 32, at 75.  See also CENTER FOR LONG-TERM CARE 
FINANCING, THE LTC TRIATHLON: LONG-TERM CARE’S RACE FOR SURVIVAL (2000), 
http://www.centerltc.org/pubs/triathlon.pdf. 
 199. See MARK MERLIS, FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ROLES, at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/ 
elders/merlis_longtermcare21st_343.asp (Sept. 1999). 
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flawed, however.  Fundamentally risk-adverse, insurers are 
motivated to cover those persons who are low-risk health service 
users, not to provide universal access.200  If insurance is intended to 
serve as the point of access to long-term care, therefore, gov-
ernment must diligently oversee and set the ground rules by which 
insurance companies go about their business.201  For example, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) prohibits the use of preexisting condition clauses to 
exclude workers who change jobs.  HIPAA does not regulate 
marketing, so insurers simply exclude those deemed undesirable 
risks through pricing and selling tactics.202 
VII. BACK TO ETHICS 
Elder law attorneys are uniquely positioned to counsel elders 
regarding this complex area of the law.  If they fail or refuse to 
counsel elders regarding legally permitted options, elder law 
attorneys will have derogated their duty to their clients.  From this 
narrow perspective—call it the legalistic perspective—a lawyer’s 
failure to advise his client of all of his long-term care financing 
options is unethical.  That is the lawyer’s duty under the rules of 
professional conduct.203  Moreover, by failing to counsel elders who 
seek advice about how to qualify for benefits under the Medicaid 
program, the legal profession would tacitly concede that America’s 
legal system, indeed its political system, no longer has room for, 
and no longer condones, divergent values. 
But that still does not answer our question: in a broader sense, 
is it ethical for the lawyer to advise the client to engage in Medicaid 
planning?  Conversely, why might it be unethical to advise a client 
who wishes to engage in Medicaid planning?  Needless to say, the 
lawyer cannot advise the client to do something that would result in 
harm to the client—not, in any event, without the client’s consent.  
Under this standard, there may be an ethical duty on the lawyer to 
advise his client of the potentially adverse consequences to the 
client that may flow from Medicaid planning (such as harm to the 
Medicaid program, limits on access to nursing home care, and the 
 
 200. See generally, CUTLER, supra note 32, at 5; see also Rice, supra note 185, at 
866. 
 201. See Stone, supra note 31, at 955. 
 202. Id. at 956. 
 203. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 2.1 (2002). 
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like).204 
But what about harm that the client could not realistically 
expect to happen to him personally, but harm that may result to 
others, such as those we will call the “truly poor”—that is, those 
who are Medicaid eligible without planning?  An elder who has 
money has options: he can plan for Medicaid eligibility, but if he 
needs care that Medicaid cannot or will not pay for, he can arrange 
his affairs so that resources may be legally unavailable to him, for 
Medicaid purposes, but nonetheless informally available to him 
(such as by transferring assets to a trusted relative who will hold the 
money for him in case he needs it).  The truly poor do not have 
that option. 
Does the lawyer have a duty not to harm the truly poor, a duty 
that derives from the duty to his client, as we discussed earlier? 
Whether they are rich or poor, elders are participants in an 
amoral health care market.  Medicaid (like its companion, 
Medicare) is not a health care delivery system.  It is a health care 
financing system that addresses interests in the market place.205  For 
an elder who is “lucky” enough to develop an acute illness, such as 
myocardial infarction or a stroke, Medicare will pay the bill.  For 
persons who are unlucky and develop a chronic illness such as 
Alzheimer’s disease that requires years of costly long-term care, the 
American health care market place forces them to “spend down” to 
Medicaid eligibility.  This acute/chronic dichotomy can be 
explained only as an artifact of the American long-term care 
financing system, as opposed to a long-term care delivery system.  
No one intends to get sick.  No moral opprobrium should therefore 
attach to efforts by the sufferer and his family to engage in 
Medicaid planning to minimize the financial impact chronic illness 
imposes on them.206 
Participants in a free market, including elders who need long-
term care, are under no obligation to pay more than the going rate 
 
 204. See ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at 433 (comparing the MRPC with the Rules of 
Model Conduct, and quoting from EC 7-8).  “It is often desirable to point out 
those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally 
permissible.”  Id.  Of course, this returns us to the question, “Is there a higher 
law?” 
 205. It cannot be a coincidence that until the name was changed in 2001, the 
federal agency that oversees Medicare and Medicaid was called the Health Care 
Financing Administration. 
 206. Morality must be doable.  MAYO, supra note 8, at 59-60.  Of course, one 
may still consider the effect of moral hazard and take appropriate measures to 
limit overuse of medical services. 
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for any commodity.  In the desert, the person who controls the 
water supply is under no obligation to sell at any price.  The price is 
therefore set by fiat rather than through negotiation.  Health care 
can be similarly viewed.  The sick and frail are frequently in no 
position to bargain for a better deal.207  To suggest that purchasers 
of health care services should pay more than the minimum net cost 
to secure those services, merely because they have the resources to 
do so, is as absurd as criticizing wealthy persons for shopping at the 
discount store, whose lower prices are driving other merchants out 
of business.208  Where the market permits planning which results in 
a reduced net price, a purchaser cannot be faulted for availing 
himself of the lower price even if he could pay more.209  In a health 
care system in which the commodity known as health is bought and 
sold, there is no reason why any market participant should value 
another person’s property (that is, health) more than his own.  
Until the United States elevates health care to a moral right, 
instead of a property right, Medicaid planning is morally and 
ethically justified. 
 
 207.  
This information asymmetry [resulting from the consumer’s lack of 
knowledge concerning the complexities of medical care diagnosis or 
treatment] gives physicians market power.  Physicians recommend to 
people what services are appropriate and often provide those services 
after they are recommended.  Physicians also have leeway in pricing, at 
a time when consumers have little ability to price shop.  Unless 
physicians have objective functions looking out for patient welfare, 
inefficient outcomes will result. 
CUTLER, supra note 32, at 26. 
 208. If patients are relegated to a competitive market, then what is good for 
the goose must also be good for the gander.  “An increasingly competitive health 
insurance market is likely to treat people less as patients and more as consumers 
who must protect themselves from error and exploitation.”  Wendy K. Mariner, 
Patients Must Have Rights, NAT’L L. J., Feb. 19, 2001, at A21, available at 
www.patient-rights.org/publications/pdfpublications/NLJpatie.pdf.  Patients must 
be allowed to protect themselves. 
 209. Indeed, self-interest is often viewed as fostering market efficiency because, 
in theory, each market participant responds appropriately to prices for the 
purpose of maximizing profit. Jeremy Waldron, Private Property, in A COMPANION 
TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 3, 13 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).  
Although it is tempting to do so, we cannot lose sight of the fact that even 
impoverished American elders seldom confront absolute poverty. See SINGER, supra 
note 17, at 218-22 (defining absolute poverty).  Does that mean Medicaid planning 
is unimportant?  Quite the contrary.  With many elders, “it’s not just his money at 
stake, but his pride and self-worth.”  MORRIS, supra note 10, at 244. 
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VIII. REFORM PROPOSALS 
Before meaningful reform can take place, the federal and state 
governments must decide which objectives and stakeholder 
interests merit priority.  If health care should be viewed as a right, 
reform proposals should be universal.  If health care is not a right, 
reform may be unnecessary; markets exist to meet the long-term 
care needs of consumers.  Even if reform did include universal 
health care, should the middle class status of the elderly be 
protected, or should elders who are struck with chronic disease be 
required to impoverish themselves before they receive assistance? 
Any long-term care reform proposal must address the major 
issue of moral hazard: whether social insurance creates a sufficient 
incentive (or disincentive) to pay for one’s own health care.210  
Health security may or may not be a right for all citizens—that is 
certainly a debatable proposition—but no one contends that the 
community owes malingerers a free ride.  Any reforms must 
include sufficient checks and balances to ensure that each recipient 
of health security has an incentive to carry his portion of society’s 
cumulative burden.211 
A solution put forward in 1998 by the Center for Long-Term 
Care Financing is called “LTC Choice.”212  The authors of this 
report deal with the “moral hazard” problem posed by the current 
system of long-term care financing (that is, Medicaid), namely that 
the system punishes those persons who are frugal and rewards 
those who are profligate, by eliminating Medicaid’s “loopholes” 
and requiring individuals who attain age sixty-five either to present 
proof of financial responsibility or to register their assets and 
income with the government. 
The tough choice is whether or not they will insure 
privately or rely on the LTC Choice program.  If they insure 
privately, or earmark sufficient assets permanently for 
 
 210. “The principal of justice is linked to . . . fairness.”  BODENHEIMER & 
GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 217 (discussing distributive justice). Even if it is 
inappropriate to define access in terms of dollars held by the person needing care, 
arguably there is nothing unfair about linking access to labor, at least for persons 
who are not disabled. 
 211. One of the basic tensions in the delivery of health care services is between 
caring for the individual and caring for the community at-large.  BODENHEIMER & 
GRUMBACH, supra note 14, at 292. 
 212. See STEPHEN A. MOSES & DAVID M. ROSENFELD, LTC CHOICE: A SIMPLE, 
COST-FREE SOLUTION TO THE LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING PUZZLE 27-30, at 
http://www.centerltc.com/pubs/CLTC.F.R.eport.pdf (Sept. 1, 1998). 
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long-term care, their problem is solved.  If they choose to 
rely on the government-backed LTC Choice program, they 
must report annually on their income and assets in order 
to secure their estates as collateral and to eliminate the 
problem of artificial self-impoverishment which has 
plagued the Medicaid program.213 
No one who could afford to purchase insurance would elect to 
make his assets and income available to the government instead. 
That of course seems to be the goal of the Center’s proposal—to 
stimulate demand for private long-term care insurance. 
Another solution, put forward by the National Academy of 
Elder Law Attorneys (NAELA), is to federalize social insurance for 
long-term care.214  Specifically, the NAELA White Paper proposes 
the creation of Medicare Part D, which would transfer 
responsibility for most long-term care financing from the states to 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.  Medicare Part D 
would be financed through payroll deductions and would provide 
each beneficiary with a pool of money to be used for any form of 
long-term care.215  NAELA proposes that the pool be $200,000 in 
2000, indexed to inflation.  There would be a $10,000 deductible, 
after which Medicare would pay 80% of the cost of care.216  
Eligibility would be decided in a manner similar to Social Security 
disability determinations, with coverage triggered at the loss of two 
activities of daily living.217  Eligibility would be presumed, with the 
government having the burden of proof if benefits are denied.218 
Both proposals are coercive, as any proposal must be to 
guarantee coverage and access to care.  LTC Choice relies on the 
private market place to provide coverage and benefits and on the 
government to deny benefits to those who are profligate; but it 
retains Medicaid as a safety net for persons who are able to prove 
they are indigent through no fault of their own.  The NAELA 
proposal relies on the social insurance model.  Individuals are 
forced to participate in the risk pool through the tax system and 
 
 213. Id. at 29. 
 214. NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 6.  The NAELA proposal is similar 
to the system Germany implemented in 1994. See Alison Evans Cuellar & Joshua M. 
Wiener, Can Social Insurance for Long-Term Care Work?: The Experience in Germany, 19 
HEALTH AFFAIRS, May-June 2000, at 8. Germany’s experience is described as a 
success.  Id. at 22. 
 215. See NAELA WHITE PAPER, supra note 48, at 21-22. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 22. 
 218. Id. at 25. 
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payroll deduction. 
As Mark Merlis points out, LTC Choice is not only “draconian” 
but impracticable.  “By the time people need long-term care, there 
is no way to determine why some people have resources and others 
do not.”219  Someone must make the decision on whether the 
applicant for Medicaid has been profligate during his lifetime or 
suffered a bad break and is deserving of public benefits.  Who 
wants to step up to the plate and tell Grandma she is not deserving 
of help? 
Moreover, both proposals suffer from the same defect:  each is 
a long-term care financing system, rather than a long-term care 
delivery system.  What happens to the elder who exhausts his 
insurance benefits or lifetime pool of money?  Will he be 
guaranteed access to care nonetheless? 
Although it is a demand-side proposal, two features in 
particular make the NAELA proposal attractive: (i) it retains 
autonomy, a value critical to many consumers, who would retain 
the right to choose the setting in which long-term care will be 
delivered; and (ii) it increases the bargaining power of long-term 
care purchasers through utilization of a national risk pool.  By 
contrast, a system of private insurance has the potential of leaving 
the purchasing system disconnected in a manner that allows health 
care providers to dictate prices, unless the federal government 
tightly regulates the long-term care insurance industry.  Where, as 
demographics make clear, demand for long-term care exceeds the 
system’s current supply, cost management (if done at all) must take 
place on the supply side.  A strong purchaser can impose a pricing 
structure on health care providers.220 
We believe members of society who are beyond what society 
marks as retirement age should be provided necessary health care 
without attaching any litmus test to its provision.  At least, that 
should be the case with respect to today’s elders who could not 
 
 219. MERLIS, supra note 199. 
 220. Among other notable proposals is that put forward by Physicians for a 
National Health Program in 1991.  See A National Long-Term Care Program for the 
United States: A Caring Vision, 266 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3023 (1991), reprinted in PNHP, 
http://www.pnhp.org/publications/JAMA12_4_91.htm (last visited June 22, 
2002).  To compare how other Western nations, including Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Germany, finance long-term care costs, see generally 324 
BRIT. MED. J. (June 29, 2002), discussing within various articles how certain 
Western nations finance long-term care, http://bmj.com/content/vol324/ 
issue7353. 
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have anticipated the devastating cost of long-term care.  What 
about tomorrow’s elders?  They have time to plan and contribute 
toward their own care.  Society cannot allow them to consume their 
resources and then expect social assistance when need arises.  To 
do so, ultimately, would allow health care recipients to consume 
their own labor and the labor of other persons.  No society can 
afford to cover unlimited health care needs for very long without 
insisting upon contribution.  An approach such as that advanced by 
NAELA would require everyone to contribute a portion of his or 
her labor to the risk pool. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
As we stated when we began, we do not expect to resolve all 
ethical questions relating to how long-term care is delivered in the 
United States.  In this article, perhaps we ask as many questions as 
we answer.  Controversies surrounding how to finance and deliver 
health care (and other social programs, such as Supplemental 
Security Income, public housing, and food stamps) will continue to 
abound so long as some persons have access to essential life-
sustaining goods and services and others do not. Furthermore, 
even if the government provides universal health care, controversy 
will continue as stakeholders debate who should be covered and 
the scope of coverage.221  Medical care presents one of “the most 
(melo)dramatic examples of the problems” associated with any 
program that, potentially, has a redistributive effect.222 
Nonetheless, our primary goal as elder law attorneys should be 
to improve the lives of our clients.  Having explicitly acknowledged 
that this is our goal, we would do well to consider the future.  As 
the NAELA White Paper says, “[t]he current system in our country 
for addressing long-term care is a non-system, a hodgepodge of 
services that fails to meet the needs of the elderly and disabled in 
the variety of long-term care settings.  It is economically inefficient 
and it fails to assure the quality of services which are provided.”223  
Even if controversy continues to surround questions of coverage 
and scope, a case can be made that moving America’s health care 
system toward a universal right is a moral imperative of the elder 
law attorney. 
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Until we attain that goal, although it is controversial and 
legitimately subject to criticism, Medicaid planning is ethical and 
defensible.  Despite what our critics say about us, elder law 
attorneys do acknowledge a place for differing ethical views.  
Where one stands on a particular issue usually depends on where 
one sits, however.  Yes, stakeholders do have differing interests, 
which cause each participant in the health care market to approach 
the Medicaid program and Medicaid planning differently.  These 
differing interests do not invalidate the wishes of clients who 
choose to engage in legally permissible asset protection strategies.   
And these differences do not make Medicaid planning “unethical,” 
but they do force clients and their lawyers to recognize that their 
acts have consequences for the American long-term care system. 
 
48
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss1/2
